基于多模态博弈模型的非点源污染控制主体行为分析

Xin Li, J. Shang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

农业面源污染问题已引起国家和社会各界的高度重视。在由政府、农民和化肥销售商组成的非点源污染控制组织中,由于理性经济主体的特点,在非点源污染控制过程中可能会出现“市场失灵”和“政府失灵”的现象。本文运用博弈论分析了三个主体的主要行为特征,构建了政府、农民和化肥销售者三方参与的不完全信息动态博弈模型。根据Haysani公理模型均衡解的结果,发现政府、化肥销售者和农民这三个主体在行为选择阶段的决策对其他两个主体的行为选择有很大的影响,并且这三个主体的每一个策略选择的过程都是三个主体的动态博弈过程。最后,根据均衡解中体现的主要影响因素,向政府主体提出了相关的非点源污染控制对策建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Analysis of the main body behaviour of non-point source pollution control based on multimodal game model
Abstract The issue of agricultural non-point source pollution has attracted the attention of the state and the masse. In the non-point source pollution control organizations which composed of the governments, farmers and fertiliser sellers, due to the characteristics of rational economic body, the phenomenon of ”market failure” and ”government failure” may occur in the process of non-point source pollution control. In this paper, the author applies game theory to analyse the main behaviour characteristics of the three main bodies, and constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model that the government, farmers and fertiliser sellers participate in. According to the results of the equilibrium solution of the Haysani Axiom model, it is found that the decisions made by the three bodies of the government, the fertiliser seller and the farmer in the behaviour choice stage have a great influence on the behaviour choice of the other two bodies, and the process of each strategy choice by the three bodies is a dynamic game process of the three bodies. Finally, according to the main influencing factors reflected in the equilibrium solution, proposed the related non-point source pollution control countermeasure suggestion to the government main body.
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