索赔抑制仲裁:新规则

IF 1.5 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
David S. Schwartz
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在附签合同中,对弱势一方施加有约束力的争议前仲裁,即所谓的“强制仲裁”,应该被承认为它的真正含义:抑制索赔的仲裁。这种仲裁程序促进解决争端的途径的论点已被驳斥,并且在没有可靠的经验支持的情况下不应继续提出。这种仲裁条款的起草者的动机是减少他们的责任风险,特别是消除对他们自己的集体索赔。此外,请求抑制仲裁违反了正当程序的两个基本原则:它允许争议一方制定争议规则;它把裁决的角色赋予了一个决策者,在关键的司法决定的结果中有经济利益,也就是说,仲裁员有权决定他们自己决定是非曲性的权力,他们在这个问题上有经济利益。最高法院通过一系列缺乏理由和不连贯的判决促进了这一原则,在这些判决中,法院的自由派尤其不善于看到消费者和雇员原告的利益。利用布雷耶法官不连贯的多数意见路线,试图确定“门户”问题,保守的法院多数派最近将仲裁条款的可执行性问题与司法审查隔离开来,并濒临允许公司被告通过使用仲裁条款使自己免于集体诉讼。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules
Binding, pre-dispute arbitration imposed on the weaker party in an adhesion contract so-called "mandatory arbitration" should be recognized for what it truly is: claim-suppressing arbitration. Arguments that such arbitration processes promote access to dispute resolution have been refuted and should not continue to be made without credible empirical support. Drafters of such arbitration clauses are motivated to reduce their liability exposure and, in particular, to eliminate class claims against themselves. Claim-suppressing arbitration, furthermore, violates two fundamental principles of due process: It allows one party to the dispute to make the disputing rules; and it gives the adjudicative role to a decision maker with a financial stake in the outcome of key jurisdictional decisions "that is to say, arbitrators have authority to decide their own power to decide the merits, a question in which they have a financial stake. The Supreme Court has facilitated this doctrine through a series of poorly-reasoned and incoherent decisions, in which the Court's liberal wing has been particularly inept at seeing the stakes for consumer and employee plaintiffs. Exploiting Justice Breyer's incoherent line of majority opinions attempting to identify "gateway" issues, the conservative Court majority has recently insulated all questions of enforceability of arbitration clauses from judicial review and is on the verge of allowing corporate defendants to immunize themselves from class actions through use of arbitration clauses.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1925, the Indiana Law Journal is a general-interest academic legal journal. The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by students of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law — Bloomington. The opportunity to become a member of the Journal is available to all students at the end of their first-year. Members are selected in one of two ways. First, students in the top of their class academically are automatically invited to become members. Second, a blind-graded writing competition is held to fill the remaining slots. This competition tests students" Bluebook skills and legal writing ability. Overall, approximately thirty-five offers are extended each year. Candidates who accept their offers make a two-year commitment to the Journal.
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