Detecting past and present intrusions through vulnerability-specific predicates

Most systems contain software with yet-to-be-discovered security vulnerabilities. When a vulnerability is disclosed, administrators face the grim reality that they have been running software which was open to attack. Sites that value availability may be forced to continue running this vulnerable software until the accompanying patch has been tested. Our goal is to improve security by detecting intrusions that occurred before the vulnerability was disclosed and by detecting and responding to intrusions that are attempted after the vulnerability is disclosed. We detect when a vulnerability is triggered by executing vulnerability-specific predicates as the system runs or replays. This paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of a system that supports the construction and execution of these vulnerability-specific predicates. Our system, called IntroVirt, uses virtual-machine introspection to monitor the execution of application and operating system software. IntroVirt executes predicates over past execution periods by combining virtual-machine introspection with virtual-machine replay. IntroVirt eases the construction of powerful predicates by allowing predicates to run existing target code in the context of the target system, and it uses checkpoints so that predicates can execute target code without perturbing the state of the target system. IntroVirt allows predicates to refresh themselves automatically so they work in the presence of preemptions. We show that vulnerability-specific predicates can be written easily for a wide variety of real vulnerabilities, can detect and respond to intrusions over both the past and present time intervals, and add little overhead for most vulnerabilities.