银行规章和贷款合同

IF 2.2 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Romulo Magalhaes, Josep A. Tribó
{"title":"银行规章和贷款合同","authors":"Romulo Magalhaes, Josep A. Tribó","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1343845","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines empirically how bank regulations adopted in lender countries influence the characteristics of loan contracts, using a sample of 46,453 loans made by 278 large commercial banks around 39 countries, to borrowers in 83 countries, in the period from 1998 to 2006. Our findings indicate that the stringency of capital regulations have an inverse U-shaped relationship with priced risk characteristics (spread and maturity) of loan contracts. In addition, more powerful official supervision is associated with riskier loan contracts. Both official supervisory power and private monitoring work as substitutes to capital regulation to reduce the (priced) risk measures of loan contracts when capital stringency is low. For higher capital stringency, supervision and private monitoring complement capital regulation in reducing loan contracts risk measures. Finally, we found that a country’s degrees of legal enforcement and bank industry competition complement capital and private monitoring regulations to improve risk characteristics of loan contracts. The evidence highlights the importance of how bank lending practices are affected by bank regulations and their interactions with themselves and other institutional country factors.","PeriodicalId":47599,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2010-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts\",\"authors\":\"Romulo Magalhaes, Josep A. Tribó\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1343845\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study examines empirically how bank regulations adopted in lender countries influence the characteristics of loan contracts, using a sample of 46,453 loans made by 278 large commercial banks around 39 countries, to borrowers in 83 countries, in the period from 1998 to 2006. Our findings indicate that the stringency of capital regulations have an inverse U-shaped relationship with priced risk characteristics (spread and maturity) of loan contracts. In addition, more powerful official supervision is associated with riskier loan contracts. Both official supervisory power and private monitoring work as substitutes to capital regulation to reduce the (priced) risk measures of loan contracts when capital stringency is low. For higher capital stringency, supervision and private monitoring complement capital regulation in reducing loan contracts risk measures. Finally, we found that a country’s degrees of legal enforcement and bank industry competition complement capital and private monitoring regulations to improve risk characteristics of loan contracts. The evidence highlights the importance of how bank lending practices are affected by bank regulations and their interactions with themselves and other institutional country factors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47599,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-04-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343845\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343845","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究利用1998年至2006年期间39个国家的278家大型商业银行向83个国家的借款人发放的46,453笔贷款的样本,从经验上考察了贷款国采用的银行监管如何影响贷款合同的特征。我们的研究结果表明,资本监管的严格程度与贷款合同的定价风险特征(价差和期限)呈反u型关系。此外,更强有力的官方监管与风险更高的贷款合同有关。在资本紧张程度较低的情况下,官方监管权力和私人监督都可以替代资本监管,以降低贷款合同的(定价的)风险指标。对于更高的资本严格性,监管和私人监督是对资本监管的补充,是降低贷款合同风险的措施。最后,我们发现一个国家的执法程度和银行业竞争对资本和私人监督监管起到了互补作用,从而改善了贷款合同的风险特征。证据突出了银行贷款实践如何受到银行监管及其与自身和其他制度性国家因素的相互作用的影响的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts
This study examines empirically how bank regulations adopted in lender countries influence the characteristics of loan contracts, using a sample of 46,453 loans made by 278 large commercial banks around 39 countries, to borrowers in 83 countries, in the period from 1998 to 2006. Our findings indicate that the stringency of capital regulations have an inverse U-shaped relationship with priced risk characteristics (spread and maturity) of loan contracts. In addition, more powerful official supervision is associated with riskier loan contracts. Both official supervisory power and private monitoring work as substitutes to capital regulation to reduce the (priced) risk measures of loan contracts when capital stringency is low. For higher capital stringency, supervision and private monitoring complement capital regulation in reducing loan contracts risk measures. Finally, we found that a country’s degrees of legal enforcement and bank industry competition complement capital and private monitoring regulations to improve risk characteristics of loan contracts. The evidence highlights the importance of how bank lending practices are affected by bank regulations and their interactions with themselves and other institutional country factors.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
European Journal of Finance
European Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
8.00%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Finance publishes a full range of research into theoretical and empirical topics in finance. The emphasis is on issues that reflect European interests and concerns. The journal aims to publish work that is motivated by significant issues in the theory or practice of finance. The journal promotes communication between finance academics and practitioners by providing a vehicle for the publication of research into European issues, stimulating research in finance within Europe, encouraging the international exchange of ideas, theories and the practical application of methodologies and playing a positive role in the development of the infrastructure for finance research.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信