中国上市公司会计信息失真分析及动态博弈模型

Q2 Social Sciences
Qin Xu, Zimin Bai
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文基于公司治理的视角,从经济利益和行政利益两个方面分析了上市公司会计信息失真的原因,探讨了上市公司会计信息失真的条件,重点研究了内部人控制、经理市场不成熟、一股独大和虚假设立独立董事等问题。本文通过构建上市公司、会计师事务所和证监会的动态博弈模型,分析了在纳什均衡状态下影响上市公司与会计师事务所串通概率和上市公司提供失真会计信息概率的重要因素,最后对上市公司会计信息失真行为提出了相应的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Analysis of Accounting Information distortion and Dynamic Game Model of Listed Companies in China
Based on the point of view of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the causes of accounting information distortion of listed companies from two aspects of economic interests and administrative interests, probes into the conditions of accounting information distortion of listed companies, and focuses on the problems of insider control, immature manager market, one dominant stock and the false establishment of independent directors. By constructing the dynamic game model of listed company, accounting firm and CSRC, this paper analyzes the important factors that affect the probability of collusion between listed company and accounting firm and the probability of providing distorted accounting information by listed company under Nash equilibrium state, and finally puts forward some corresponding suggestions for the distortion behavior of accounting information of listed company.
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来源期刊
Asian Journal of Business Research
Asian Journal of Business Research Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
8
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