纸龙贼

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Nelson
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引用次数: 6

摘要

法律的发展使公司形式变得更加不透明,并允许赋予其生命力的代理人逃避个人对其行为的责任。该法律现在为从事广泛的欺诈行为的代理人提供保护,这些欺诈行为对公众造成了巨大的伤害。本文挑战了股东责任和董事责任足以控制代理人行为的学术正统,通过发展纸龙类比来关注代理人在公司动画中的重要性。缺乏对代理人的问责鼓励了导致金融危机的欺诈模式,在这场危机中,世界上45%的财富消失了,而且这种模式还在继续重演。这篇文章揭示了使公司形式变得更加不透明是如何导致对个人的公司阴谋指控的破坏,以及现在证券法作为一种惩戒代理人的方法的崩溃。文章最后呼吁人们既要观看纸龙,也要追踪移动纸龙脚的舞者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Paper Dragon Thieves
Developments in the law are making the corporate form more opaque and allowing the agents who animate it to escape individual accountability for their actions. The law now provides protection for agents to engage in widespread frauds that inflict massive harm on the public. This article challenges the academic orthodoxy that shareholder and director liability are enough to control agent behavior by developing a paper dragon analogy to focus on the importance of agents in corporate animation. Lack of agent accountability encourages the patterns of fraud that caused the financial crisis in which forty-five percent of the world’s wealth disappeared, and which continue to be repeated. The article reveals how making the corporate form more opaque has led to the destruction of corporate conspiracy charges for individuals and now the implosion of securities law as a method of disciplining agents. The article concludes with a call for both watching the paper dragon and the need to track the dancers who move its feet.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Georgetown Law Journal is headquartered at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. and has since its inception published more than 500 issues, as well as the widely-used Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (ARCP). The Journal is currently, and always has been, run by law students.
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