自然资源谈判

IF 1 Q3 ECONOMICS

Global Economy Journal Pub Date : 2021-07-05 DOI:10.1142/S2194565921500056

Joseph Pelzman, Murat Issabayev, Yessengali Oskenbayev

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引用次数: 0

摘要

资源丰富国(RRC)的东道国政府(HG)在与多家国际石油公司(ioc)打交道时，面临着同时进行多边报价还是根据资源价值顺序进行双边报价的选择。假设HG将同时进行谈判的所有外国合作伙伴视为一个单一实体，则认为HG预计将从同时进行的多边谈判交易中获得比从与每个参与者的连续双边谈判中获得更高的股权份额。此外，由于大联盟的超可加性和效率特性，在序次双边博弈具有正弱外部性的情况下，HG仍然倾向于同时多边博弈。

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NEGOTIATION ON NATURAL RESOURCES

The host government (HG) of resource-rich countries (RRC) dealing with multiple International Oil Companies (IOCs) faces a choice between making a simultaneous multilateral offer and a sequential bilateral offer on equity shares from resource value. Provided that the HG treats all its foreign partners in a simultaneous negotiation as a single entity, it is argued that the HG is predicted to gain a higher equity share from a simultaneous multilateral bargaining deal than from a sequential bilateral one with each player. Furthermore, we argue that in case of positive weak externality from a sequential bilateral game, HG would still prefer a simultaneous multilateral game due to superadditivity and efficiency properties of grand coalition.

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来源期刊

Global Economy Journal ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

14.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The GEJ seeks to publish original and innovative research, as well as novel analysis, relating to the global economy. While its main emphasis is economic, the GEJ is a multi-disciplinary journal. The GEJ''s contents mirror the diverse interests and approaches of scholars involved with the international dimensions of business, economics, finance, history, law, marketing, management, political science, and related areas. The GEJ also welcomes scholarly contributions from officials with government agencies, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations. One over-arching theme that unites IT&FA members and gives focus to this journal is the complex globalization process, involving flows of goods and services, money, people, and information.