金融的政治经济学

M. Pagano, P. Volpin
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引用次数: 357

摘要

如果控制权的私人利益很高,而管理层拥有少量股权,那么管理者和工人就会成为天然的盟友。有两股力量在起作用。首先,管理者通过签订慷慨的长期劳动合同,有效地将员工变成了“毒丸”,从而降低了公司对收购者的吸引力。其次,员工充当现任管理者的“白衣侍从”,游说反对敌意收购,以保护现任管理者享有的高工资。我们的模型与现有的实证研究结果一致,并产生了新的预测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Political Economy of Finance
If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a “poison pill’’ by signing generous long-term labor contracts and thereby reducing the firm’s attractiveness to a raider. Second, employees act as “white squires’’ for the incumbent managers, lobbying against hostile takeovers to protect the high wages enjoyed under incumbent management. Our model is consistent with available empirical findings, and yields new predictions as well.
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