推定因果关系?为什么最高法院应该驳回幻影损失并撤销布鲁多案

Q2 Social Sciences
J. Coffee
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引用次数: 8

摘要

最高法院即将审理Dura制药公司诉Broudo案,第九巡回法院在该案中显著放宽了适用于联邦证券诉讼的“损失因果关系”标准。在回应Merritt Fox教授的一篇支持这种自由化,甚至放弃损失因果关系作为必要因素的文章时,Coffee教授认为,任何因果关系标准的变化,如果允许原告逃避证明由于重大错报或遗漏而导致的证券股票市场价格下跌,就会产生不正当的激励。这可能会导致虚幻损失的赔偿,而这些损失可能是由市场泡沫等其他因素造成的。更一般地说,他认为,在二级市场股票下跌的情况下,针对公司被告的证券集体诉讼似乎没有起到什么合法作用,既没有起到补偿作用,也没有起到威慑作用。相反,这种针对公司的行动(相对于针对看门人、控制人或主要市场环境中的公司的行动)主要是在很大程度上分散的股东之间造成低效的财富转移。考虑到所涉及的法律和其他交易成本,股东似乎可能成为此类行动的净输家。因此,他的结论是,进一步最小化因果关系要求应该等待政策澄清针对非交易发行人被告的“市场欺诈”行为的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo
The Supreme Court is about to hear Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo, a case in which the Ninth Circuit significantly liberalized the "loss causation" standards applicable to federal securities litigation. In response to a companion article by Professor Merritt Fox, which favors such a liberalization and even the abandonment of loss causation as a necessary element, Professor Coffee argues that any change in causation standards that permits a plaintiff to escape showing a decline in the security's stock market price attributable to the material misstatement or omission gives rise to perverse incentives, which would likely result in the award of phantom losses that may have been caused instead by other factors, such as a market bubble. More generally, he argues that the securities class action against the corporate defendant in cases of secondary market stock drops appears to serve little legitimate function, advancing neither compensatory nor deterrent ends. Instead, such actions against the corporation (as opposed to actions against gatekeepers, controlling persons or the corporation in the primary market setting) principally effect inefficient wealth transfers among largely diversified shareholders. Given the legal and other transaction costs involved, shareholders appear likely to be net losers from such actions. As a result, he concludes that further minimization of the causation requirement should await policy clarification of the role of the "fraud on the market" action against a non-trading issuer defendant.
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来源期刊
Business Lawyer
Business Lawyer Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Published quarterly, The Business Lawyer is the premier business law journal in the country, circulating to approximately 60,000 readers. It contains articles of significant interest to the business lawyer, including case law analysis, and developing trends
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