金融危机过去12年了,“大到不能倒”的问题依然存在。对金融稳定委员会谘询报告《大而不能倒的改革影响评估》的评论

M. Hellwig
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引用次数: 6

摘要

该文件包含对金融稳定委员会(FSB)咨询报告的评论,该报告涉及自2007-2009年全球金融危机以来监管改革的成功。根据这些评论,FSB对股权作用的评估过于狭隘,其措辞仅局限于避免破产和鼓励冒险,而没有注意到债务积压会扭曲融资选择,也没有注意到充足的股权在亏损后减少去杠杆化需求的系统性影响,以及股权有助于随着时间的推移平滑贷款和资产购买。金融稳定委员会对系统性风险的处理很少关注系统中不同部分之间的相互依存关系,而线性因果关系并不能很好地反映这种关系。最后,评论指出,对具有系统重要性的机构进行银行清算仍然是不可行的,因为政治上对单点进入程序缺乏接受,因为银行在清算中缺乏资金(在欧盟),因为缺乏财政支持(在欧盟),以及缺乏政治上对银行通过纾困进行清算的接受度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Twelve Years after the Financial Crisis – Too-big-to-fail is still with us. Comments on the Financial Stability Board’s Consultation Report ‘Evaluation of the Effects of Too-big-to-fail Reforms’
The paper contains comments made on the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Consultation Report concerning the success of regulatory reforms since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. According to these comments, the FSB’s assessment of the role of equity is too narrow, being phrased in terms of bankruptcy avoidance and risk taking incentives, without attention to debt overhang creating distortions in funding choices, as well as the systemic impact of ample equity reducing deleveraging needs after losses and equity contributing to smoothing of lending and asset purchases over time. The FSB’s treatment of systemic risk pays too little attention to mutual interdependence of different parts of the system that is not well captured by linear causal relationships. Finally, the comments point out that bank resolution of systemically important institutions is still not viable, for lack of political acceptance of single-point-of-entry procedures, for lack of funding of banks in resolution (in the EI), for lack of fiscal backstops (in the EU), and for lack of political acceptance of bank resolution with bail-in.
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