Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR

the Arab Peace Initiative is still presented as the correct path to end the conflict, but very little diplomatic efforts have been invested to convince or pressure the Israelis to accept it. Third, Turkey, the other major regional power, has not been able to provide the GCC states with the security assurances they need. Like Iran, Turkey is a non-Arab regional power, but, unlike Tehran, Ankara is a Sunni-majority state. Given the Ottoman legacy and President Erdoğan’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have never trusted Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara’s close ties to Doha has further fueled Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s mistrust. This rift between some GCC states and Turkey has positioned Israel as a regional power that can protect the Gulf Arabs from perceived Iranian threat. Fourth, as Jones and Guzansky rightly point out, not all GCC states perceive Iran as an enemy. Qatar shares the largest natural gas structure in the world –– the South Pars in Iran and North Field in Qatar ––with Iran. Accordingly, Doha has always maintained good neighborly relations with Tehran. Similarly, Muscat shares the Strait of Hormuz with Tehran, and the two nations have always enjoyed good working relations. Meanwhile, Kuwait has always sought to strike a balance between Riyadh, Tehran, and Baghdad. The rift between Qatar, on one side, and Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain (along with Egypt), on the other, means there is no unified Gulf Arab stance on Iran. Fifth, despite the increasingly warming ties between some GCC rulers and Israel, one can argue that more work is needed to get GCC societies to accept Israel. Stated differently, it seems that some Arab regimes are ahead of their people when it comes to normalizing relations with Israel. There are no accurate polls to survey how people in the GCC states feel about normalizing relations with the Jewish state. More efforts are needed to sell normalization to the public. Fraternal Enemies gives the reader a comprehensive background to the history of GCCIsrael ties and explores the main issues between the two sides. Jones and Guzansky make references to the strategic implications of this growing cooperation between the two sides. The last few months of 2020 have witnessed a number of significant developments that are likely to, positively or negatively, impact not only Israel and the GCC states, but the entire Middle East. These developments include establishing full diplomatic and economic ties between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel; the election of Joe Biden as president of the United States; and the growing animosity between Israel and Iran. How these developments will play out is yet to be seen.