{"title":"物联网环境下标准必要专利的最终产品与组件级许可","authors":"D. Geradin, Dimitrios Katsifis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3848532","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The appropriate level of licensing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the case of a multi-tiered supply chain is among the most hotly debated issues in the SEP community and at the crux of an ongoing dispute between Nokia and Daimler. The debate centres on whether the SEP holder is (or should be) under an obligation to grant a license to any implementer, including component makers, or whether the SEP holder is (or should be) free to only license at the end-product level. After examining the various arguments raised in favour of and against each licensing model, we consider there are strong policy reasons to promote component-level licensing in the context of the Internet of Things. Component-level licensing is more likely to reduce transaction costs and spur downstream innovation of implementers, while preserving the SEP holders’ incentives to innovate. At a positive level, we examine whether a SEP holder that has given a FRAND commitment to a standardization body may be under an obligation under contract law or EU competition rules to grant a license to component suppliers. We consider that, properly interpreted, ETSI’s IPR Policy obliges SEP holders to license any implementer that seeks such license, regardless of the latter’s position in a supply chain. Assuming that the SEP owner holds a dominant position per Article 102 TFEU, it is argued then a similar conclusion can be reached on the basis of EU competition law.","PeriodicalId":48724,"journal":{"name":"Law Probability & Risk","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"End-product- vs Component-level Licensing of Standard Essential Patents in the Internet of Things Context\",\"authors\":\"D. Geradin, Dimitrios Katsifis\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3848532\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The appropriate level of licensing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the case of a multi-tiered supply chain is among the most hotly debated issues in the SEP community and at the crux of an ongoing dispute between Nokia and Daimler. The debate centres on whether the SEP holder is (or should be) under an obligation to grant a license to any implementer, including component makers, or whether the SEP holder is (or should be) free to only license at the end-product level. After examining the various arguments raised in favour of and against each licensing model, we consider there are strong policy reasons to promote component-level licensing in the context of the Internet of Things. Component-level licensing is more likely to reduce transaction costs and spur downstream innovation of implementers, while preserving the SEP holders’ incentives to innovate. At a positive level, we examine whether a SEP holder that has given a FRAND commitment to a standardization body may be under an obligation under contract law or EU competition rules to grant a license to component suppliers. We consider that, properly interpreted, ETSI’s IPR Policy obliges SEP holders to license any implementer that seeks such license, regardless of the latter’s position in a supply chain. Assuming that the SEP owner holds a dominant position per Article 102 TFEU, it is argued then a similar conclusion can be reached on the basis of EU competition law.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48724,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law Probability & Risk\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law Probability & Risk\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"100\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3848532\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law Probability & Risk","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3848532","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
End-product- vs Component-level Licensing of Standard Essential Patents in the Internet of Things Context
The appropriate level of licensing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the case of a multi-tiered supply chain is among the most hotly debated issues in the SEP community and at the crux of an ongoing dispute between Nokia and Daimler. The debate centres on whether the SEP holder is (or should be) under an obligation to grant a license to any implementer, including component makers, or whether the SEP holder is (or should be) free to only license at the end-product level. After examining the various arguments raised in favour of and against each licensing model, we consider there are strong policy reasons to promote component-level licensing in the context of the Internet of Things. Component-level licensing is more likely to reduce transaction costs and spur downstream innovation of implementers, while preserving the SEP holders’ incentives to innovate. At a positive level, we examine whether a SEP holder that has given a FRAND commitment to a standardization body may be under an obligation under contract law or EU competition rules to grant a license to component suppliers. We consider that, properly interpreted, ETSI’s IPR Policy obliges SEP holders to license any implementer that seeks such license, regardless of the latter’s position in a supply chain. Assuming that the SEP owner holds a dominant position per Article 102 TFEU, it is argued then a similar conclusion can be reached on the basis of EU competition law.
期刊介绍:
Law, Probability & Risk is a fully refereed journal which publishes papers dealing with topics on the interface of law and probabilistic reasoning. These are interpreted broadly to include aspects relevant to the interpretation of scientific evidence, the assessment of uncertainty and the assessment of risk. The readership includes academic lawyers, mathematicians, statisticians and social scientists with interests in quantitative reasoning.
The primary objective of the journal is to cover issues in law, which have a scientific element, with an emphasis on statistical and probabilistic issues and the assessment of risk.
Examples of topics which may be covered include communications law, computers and the law, environmental law, law and medicine, regulatory law for science and technology, identification problems (such as DNA but including other materials), sampling issues (drugs, computer pornography, fraud), offender profiling, credit scoring, risk assessment, the role of statistics and probability in drafting legislation, the assessment of competing theories of evidence (possibly with a view to forming an optimal combination of them). In addition, a whole new area is emerging in the application of computers to medicine and other safety-critical areas. New legislation is required to define the responsibility of computer experts who develop software for tackling these safety-critical problems.