股权溢价和控制权私人利益的决定因素

R. Albuquerque, Enrique J. Schroth
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引用次数: 10

摘要

我们研究了协商块交易中控制的私人利益的决定因素。我们估计了Burkart, Gromb和Panunzi(2000)中的大宗定价模型,该模型明确处理了数据中存在的大宗溢价和大宗折扣。我们发现证据表明,大宗溢价和大宗折扣的发生取决于控股股东对抗目标股票潜在收购要约的能力。私人收益占目标公司股票市场价值的3%。私人收益随着目标的现金持有量而增加,随着目标的短期债务而减少,这为Jensen的自由现金流假说提供了证据。对强制性投标规则的一项反事实政策评估表明,它未能为股东增加价值,因为它未能阻止减少福利的交易,而且,通过强迫低效的收购要约,它阻碍了增加福利的交易。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control
We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly dealing with the existence of both block premia and block discounts in the data. We find evidence that the occurrence of block premia and block discounts depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. Private benefits represent 3% of the target firm's stock market value. Private benefits increase with the target's cash holdings and decrease with its short term debt providing evidence in favor of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis. A counterfactual policy evaluation of the Mandatory Bid Rule suggests that it fails to add value to shareholders because it fails to prevent welfare decreasing transactions and, by forcing inefficient tender offers, it deters welfare increasing transactions.
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