{"title":"董事会属性和管理层所有权对现金持有量的影响:使用GMM和分位数回归的经验证据","authors":"Dorra Talbi, Ines Menchaoui","doi":"10.1108/cg-04-2021-0145","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThe purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThe present study examines a sample of 70 listed firms in Saudi Arabia observed during the period stretching from 2006 to 2016. To test the hypotheses, the authors used generalized method of moments and quantile regressions.\n\n\nFindings\nThe empirical results reveal that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are inefficient in the Saudi context. In fact, the authors found that board size, board independence, duality and managerial ownership impact positively and significantly cash holdings. Additionally, quantile regressions confirm the results that at certain thresholds, CG mechanisms are not efficient in protecting shareholders’ interests. Shariah compliance is found to moderate negatively and significantly the studied relationship.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThis study helps to not only clarify and help decision-makers to see the importance of corporate cash management but also to identify the limits of the CG mechanisms put in place.\n","PeriodicalId":47880,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings: empirical evidence using GMM and quantile regressions\",\"authors\":\"Dorra Talbi, Ines Menchaoui\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/cg-04-2021-0145\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nPurpose\\nThe purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings.\\n\\n\\nDesign/methodology/approach\\nThe present study examines a sample of 70 listed firms in Saudi Arabia observed during the period stretching from 2006 to 2016. To test the hypotheses, the authors used generalized method of moments and quantile regressions.\\n\\n\\nFindings\\nThe empirical results reveal that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are inefficient in the Saudi context. In fact, the authors found that board size, board independence, duality and managerial ownership impact positively and significantly cash holdings. Additionally, quantile regressions confirm the results that at certain thresholds, CG mechanisms are not efficient in protecting shareholders’ interests. Shariah compliance is found to moderate negatively and significantly the studied relationship.\\n\\n\\nOriginality/value\\nThis study helps to not only clarify and help decision-makers to see the importance of corporate cash management but also to identify the limits of the CG mechanisms put in place.\\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":47880,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-04-2021-0145\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-04-2021-0145","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings: empirical evidence using GMM and quantile regressions
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings.
Design/methodology/approach
The present study examines a sample of 70 listed firms in Saudi Arabia observed during the period stretching from 2006 to 2016. To test the hypotheses, the authors used generalized method of moments and quantile regressions.
Findings
The empirical results reveal that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are inefficient in the Saudi context. In fact, the authors found that board size, board independence, duality and managerial ownership impact positively and significantly cash holdings. Additionally, quantile regressions confirm the results that at certain thresholds, CG mechanisms are not efficient in protecting shareholders’ interests. Shariah compliance is found to moderate negatively and significantly the studied relationship.
Originality/value
This study helps to not only clarify and help decision-makers to see the importance of corporate cash management but also to identify the limits of the CG mechanisms put in place.
期刊介绍:
Providing a consistent source of in-depth information, analysis and advice considering corporate governance on an international scale, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society focuses on knowledge development, practice and performance standards for scholars and Boards of Directors/ Governors of companies throughout the world. The journal publishes a diverse range of substantive theoretical and methodological debates as well as practical developments in the field of corporate governance worldwide. The journal particularly encourages attention to the impact of changes of business/corporate governance forms and practices on people, and the sustainability of different governance models. Articles that highlight models and structures that advance the interests, dignity and well being of all stakeholders, in a sustainable manner, are particularly welcome. The journal covers a broad spectrum of governance-related themes including: -Effective boardroom performance -Control and regulation -Executive leadership -The role and contribution of external (non-executive) directors -The growing importance of governance in the wake of ever-greater corporate scandals -Redefinitions and reassessments of corporate governance models -The role of business in society -The changing nature of the relationship and responsibilities of the firm towards various stakeholders -The incentives required to encourage more socially- and environmentally-responsible corporate action -The role and impact of local and international regulatory agencies and regimes on corporate behaviour.