群体性别多样性,个人权力和影响,和集体冒险

K. Wabara
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引用次数: 1

摘要

利用多次获得艾美奖的电视游戏节目《现金出租车》作为伪实验室,我们发现,一个强大或有影响力的女性在一个小(以前同质的男性)群体中(或加入)的存在(或增加)显著降低了该群体承担定性过度金融风险的意愿。然而,如果一个小组(至少三人)由一个这样的女性组成,增加更多的女性并不会显著改变小组的冒险行为。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,个人或子群体的权力和影响力份额,而不仅仅是数字实力,决定了他们的倾向(例如,相对冒险行为)是否体现在集体决策/结果中。我们的研究结果对其他环境(例如,公司董事会)的研究具有外部意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Group Gender Diversity, Individual Power and Influence, and Collective Risk-Taking
Using the multiple Emmy Award-winning television game show, Cash Cab, as a pseudo-laboratory, we find that the presence (or addition) of one powerful or influential female in (or to) a small (previously homogeneous male) group significantly reduces the group’s willingness to take qualitatively excessive financial risks. If, however, a group (of at least three persons) consists of one such female, adding more females does not significantly alter the risk-taking behavior of the group. Overall, our results show that an individual’s or a subgroup’s share of power and influence, not just numerical strength, determines whether their tendencies (e.g., relative risk-taking behavior) manifest in collective decisions/outcomes. Our findings have external implications for studies in other settings (e.g., the corporate board).
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