人们说什么和人们如何玩:钓鱼行为的混合方法和多重测量与外部有效性的含义

Nicole Naar, M. Grote, M. Borgerhoff Mulder
{"title":"人们说什么和人们如何玩:钓鱼行为的混合方法和多重测量与外部有效性的含义","authors":"Nicole Naar, M. Grote, M. Borgerhoff Mulder","doi":"10.1525/gp.2022.35863","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Does resource extraction during experimental economic games reflect resource use and behavior in other contexts? This question about external validity is central to determining the inferences that can be drawn from experimental evidence to broader sets of circumstances. Building on previous studies of external validity, which often raise concerns about the generalizability of experimental economic games to other contexts, we instead highlight parallelism between behavior inside and outside of games and its implications for applied research. Here we present the results from a framed multiphase common-pool resource game played with fishermen from a fishing community in Baja California Sur to explore the associations between game play and both self-reported and observed behavioral measures. Participants played an experimental economic game that incorporated both fisheries-specific resource dynamics and the current policy context of local fisheries management. Game administration followed two years of interviews, participant observation, and household surveys in the community. In addition to providing an in-depth understanding of the broader social-ecological context, this allowed us to compare similar game, self-reported, and observed behaviors for the same individuals. Overall, we found little evidence for external validity in terms of parallelism. None of the tests for association between fishing behaviors in the game and survey met the study-wide significance threshold. Only one association—between game behavior and conservation values—was significant at the single-test level. Based on our results, we caution against relying solely on experimental economic games as proxies for behaviors regarding resource use when developing policies. Collecting multiple or iterative measures of behavior using mixed methods is a necessary precaution, especially if the goal is to make specific policy recommendations.","PeriodicalId":91118,"journal":{"name":"Journal of global health perspectives","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What People Say and How People Play: Mixed Methods and Multiple Measures of Fishing Behavior with Implications for External Validity\",\"authors\":\"Nicole Naar, M. Grote, M. Borgerhoff Mulder\",\"doi\":\"10.1525/gp.2022.35863\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Does resource extraction during experimental economic games reflect resource use and behavior in other contexts? This question about external validity is central to determining the inferences that can be drawn from experimental evidence to broader sets of circumstances. Building on previous studies of external validity, which often raise concerns about the generalizability of experimental economic games to other contexts, we instead highlight parallelism between behavior inside and outside of games and its implications for applied research. Here we present the results from a framed multiphase common-pool resource game played with fishermen from a fishing community in Baja California Sur to explore the associations between game play and both self-reported and observed behavioral measures. Participants played an experimental economic game that incorporated both fisheries-specific resource dynamics and the current policy context of local fisheries management. Game administration followed two years of interviews, participant observation, and household surveys in the community. In addition to providing an in-depth understanding of the broader social-ecological context, this allowed us to compare similar game, self-reported, and observed behaviors for the same individuals. Overall, we found little evidence for external validity in terms of parallelism. None of the tests for association between fishing behaviors in the game and survey met the study-wide significance threshold. Only one association—between game behavior and conservation values—was significant at the single-test level. Based on our results, we caution against relying solely on experimental economic games as proxies for behaviors regarding resource use when developing policies. Collecting multiple or iterative measures of behavior using mixed methods is a necessary precaution, especially if the goal is to make specific policy recommendations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":91118,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of global health perspectives\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of global health perspectives\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2022.35863\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of global health perspectives","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2022.35863","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

实验性经济游戏中的资源提取是否反映了其他情境下的资源使用和行为?这个关于外部有效性的问题是决定从实验证据到更广泛的环境中得出的推论的核心。基于之前关于外部有效性的研究(游戏邦注:这些研究经常关注实验性经济游戏在其他情境中的普遍性),我们转而强调游戏内外行为之间的并行性及其对应用研究的影响。在这里,我们展示了一个多阶段公共资源游戏的结果,该游戏与来自下加利福尼亚州南部一个渔业社区的渔民一起进行,以探索游戏玩法与自我报告和观察行为测量之间的关系。与会者玩了一个实验性的经济游戏,其中结合了特定渔业的资源动态和当地渔业管理的当前政策背景。游戏管理遵循了两年的访谈、参与者观察和社区家庭调查。除了提供对更广泛的社会生态背景的深入理解外,这还使我们能够比较相似的游戏、自我报告和观察到的相同个体的行为。总的来说,我们发现很少有证据表明在平行度方面存在外部效度。在游戏中钓鱼行为与调查之间的关联测试中,没有一个达到研究范围内的显著性阈值。只有一种联系——游戏行为和保护价值之间的联系——在单一测试水平上是显著的。基于我们的研究结果,我们警告说,在制定政策时,不要仅仅依靠实验性经济博弈作为资源使用行为的代理。使用混合方法收集多个或迭代的行为度量是必要的预防措施,特别是如果目标是提出具体的政策建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What People Say and How People Play: Mixed Methods and Multiple Measures of Fishing Behavior with Implications for External Validity
Does resource extraction during experimental economic games reflect resource use and behavior in other contexts? This question about external validity is central to determining the inferences that can be drawn from experimental evidence to broader sets of circumstances. Building on previous studies of external validity, which often raise concerns about the generalizability of experimental economic games to other contexts, we instead highlight parallelism between behavior inside and outside of games and its implications for applied research. Here we present the results from a framed multiphase common-pool resource game played with fishermen from a fishing community in Baja California Sur to explore the associations between game play and both self-reported and observed behavioral measures. Participants played an experimental economic game that incorporated both fisheries-specific resource dynamics and the current policy context of local fisheries management. Game administration followed two years of interviews, participant observation, and household surveys in the community. In addition to providing an in-depth understanding of the broader social-ecological context, this allowed us to compare similar game, self-reported, and observed behaviors for the same individuals. Overall, we found little evidence for external validity in terms of parallelism. None of the tests for association between fishing behaviors in the game and survey met the study-wide significance threshold. Only one association—between game behavior and conservation values—was significant at the single-test level. Based on our results, we caution against relying solely on experimental economic games as proxies for behaviors regarding resource use when developing policies. Collecting multiple or iterative measures of behavior using mixed methods is a necessary precaution, especially if the goal is to make specific policy recommendations.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信