评估PRISM反应堆作为处置英国钚储备的一种选择

IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Christopher Fichtlscherer, F. Frieß, M. Kütt
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要英国考虑使用PRISM钠冷快堆作为处理其从MAGNOX和先进气冷堆乏燃料后处理产生的民用钚的选择。本文评估了英国库存的PRISM反应堆的钚处置能力。这篇文章首先描述了这个储备是如何创建的。然后,它提供了反应堆燃烧的模拟,模拟了PRISM乏燃料产生的同位素组成和该燃料的剂量率。假定在距燃料1米处的剂量率大于1西沃特/小时,就可建立“防扩散”,并构成对扩散者的辐射屏障。结果表明,使用两个840兆瓦的PRISM堆芯,以30兆瓦/千兆米的燃耗速率运行,英国的库存可以在31.3年的时间内达到防扩散目标。等到英国所有的钚都被辐照后,“棱镜”项目的一小部分乏燃料的衰变将低于防扩散目标。因此,尽管英国政府在2019年取消了对PRISM的考虑,因为它预计在未来20年内无法用于该用途,但本文得出的结论是,如果PRISM更早投入使用,它仍然是钚处置的糟糕选择。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Assessing the PRISM reactor as a disposition option for the British plutonium stockpile
Abstract The United Kingdom considered using the PRISM sodium-cooled fast reactor as a disposition option for its civilian plutonium from reprocessed MAGNOX and Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor spent fuel. This article assesses the plutonium disposition capabilities of the PRISM reactor for the U.K. stockpile. The article first describes how the stockpile was created. It then provides a simulation of reactor burn-up, the resultant isotopic compositions of PRISM spent fuel are simulated and the dose rates of that fuel. Dose rates greater than 1 Sv/h at 1 meter from the fuel were assumed to establish “proliferation resistance” and would constitute a radiation barrier to proliferators. Results suggest that the U.K. stockpile could be irradiated to that proliferation resistance target in 31.3 years, using two 840 MWth PRISM cores operating at a 30 MWd/kgHM burnup rate. By the time all the U.K. plutonium has been irradiated, however a fraction of the PRISM spent fuel will have decayed below the proliferation resistance target. Thus, even though in 2019 PRISM was removed from consideration by the U.K. government because it is not expected to be available for that use for another 20 years, this paper concludes that should PRISM become available earlier it would still be a poor choice for plutonium disposition.
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来源期刊
Science & Global Security
Science & Global Security INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
8
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