不确定、动态、零和博弈的强化学习算法

S. Mukhopadhyay, Omkar J. Tilak, S. Chakrabarti
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引用次数: 11

摘要

动态零和博弈是一种多主体决策模型,在数学博弈论文献中得到了很好的研究。在本文中,我们推导了该问题解存在的充分条件,然后讨论了求解这种存在不确定性的动态博弈的各种强化学习策略,其中不同状态下的博弈矩阵以及不同agent动作下状态之间的转移概率是未知的。提出了一种基于学习自动机异构博弈(HEGLA)的新算法,以及基于模型和无模型强化学习的算法,作为在假设马尔可夫均衡策略满足存在的充分条件时学习解的可能方法。HEGLA算法涉及到自动机同时与一些自动机进行零和博弈,并与其他一些自动机进行相同的收益博弈。模拟研究报告,以补充理论和算法的讨论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reinforcement Learning Algorithms for Uncertain, Dynamic, Zero-Sum Games
Dynamic zero-sum games are a model of multiagent decision-making that has been well-studied in the mathematical game theory literature. In this paper, we derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a solution to this problem, and then proceed to discuss various reinforcement learning strategies to solve such a dynamic game in the presence of uncertainty where the game matrices at various states as well as the transition probabilities between the states under different agent actions are unknown. A novel algorithm, based on heterogeneous games of learning automata (HEGLA), as well as algorithms based on model-based and model-free reinforcement learning, are presented as possible approaches to learning the solution Markov equilibrium policies when they are assumed to satisfy the sufficient conditions for existence. The HEGLA algorithm involves automata simultaneously playing zero-sum games with some automata and identical pay-off games with some other automata. Simulation studies are reported to complement the theoretical and algorithmic discussions.
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