巴西的新投资条约模式:为什么是现在?

Q2 Arts and Humanities
L. S. Amorim, H. Menezes
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引用次数: 0

摘要

投资条约制度与其他经济制度不同,缺乏共同的实质性多边规则,取决于各国签署双边或诸边投资条约。由于该体制表现出对发达国家的偏袒,发展中国家,尤其是拉美国家,一直到上世纪80年代都避免签署投资条约。巴西跟随这一趋势,直到20世纪90年代末才启动投资条约计划。然而,这些条约从未生效。该国还避免加入世界银行负责投资仲裁程序的机构——解决投资争端国际中心(ICSID)。2015年,巴西启动了一项新的投资条约项目。然而,时机似乎有悖直觉。投资条约制度已经受到批评,包括在吸引外国投资方面效率低下、有可能侵犯各国的管制主权以及其投资者-国家争端解决程序缺乏合法性。此外,当时有利的外国经济形势并没有迫使该国寻求外国资本的流入。新的《合作与便利化投资协定》(CFIA)是作为发展中国家的投资条约模式提出的,因为它回应了对投资条约制度的主要批评,同时满足了巴西工业部门这一重要的国内利益集团对法律框架的要求,以减轻其日益国际化的业务的政治风险。面对传统的投资争端解决模式的失败,巴西的CFIA可能被视为其他发展中国家可以效仿的一个模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Brazil’s New Investment Treaty Model: Why Now?
The investment treaty regime, unlike other economic regimes, lacks common substantive multilateral rules and depends on countries signing bilateral or plurilateral investment treaties. As the regime presented a pro-developed country bias, developing countries, especially in Latin America, avoided signing investment treaties up to the 1980s. Brazil followed this trend and did not start an investment treaty program until the late 1990s. However, the treaties never entered into force. The country also avoided acceding to the World Bank agency responsible for investment arbitration proceedings - the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In 2015, Brazil started a new investment treaty program. However, the timing seems counterintuitive. The investment treaty regime had already been criticized, including inefficiency in attracting foreign investment, the potential to encroach on countries’ regulatory sovereignty and the lack of legitimacy of its investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedure. Furthermore, the favorable foreign economic scenario did not force the country to seek an inflow of foreign capital at that time. The new Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) is presented as an investment treaty model for developing countries, since it responds to major criticisms to the investment treaty regime, and at the same time meets the demands of an important domestic interest group, the Brazilian industrial sector, for a legal framework that mitigates the political risk of its increasingly internationalized operations. Brazil’s CFIA may be viewed as a model that other developing countries could emulate in the face of the failure of the traditional paradigm of investment dispute settlement.
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来源期刊
Vestnik RUDN International Relations
Vestnik RUDN International Relations Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
审稿时长
24 weeks
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