{"title":"切换默认规则","authors":"C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.255993","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.","PeriodicalId":47736,"journal":{"name":"New York University Law Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"106"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"182","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Switching the Default Rule\",\"authors\":\"C. Sunstein\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.255993\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47736,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New York University Law Review\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"106\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2001-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"182\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New York University Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.255993\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New York University Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.255993","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.
期刊介绍:
The New York University Law Review is a generalist journal publishing legal scholarship in all areas, including legal theory and policy, environmental law, legal history, international law, and more. Each year, our six issues contain cutting-edge legal scholarship written by professors, judges, and legal practitioners, as well as Notes written by members of the Law Review.