切换默认规则

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
C. Sunstein
{"title":"切换默认规则","authors":"C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.255993","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.","PeriodicalId":47736,"journal":{"name":"New York University Law Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"106"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"182","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Switching the Default Rule\",\"authors\":\"C. Sunstein\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.255993\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47736,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New York University Law Review\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"106\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2001-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"182\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New York University Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.255993\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New York University Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.255993","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 182

摘要

合同法中的违约规则有一个标准的分析,包括那些属于雇佣法标签下的合同法形式。但是行为经济学提出了许多复杂的问题。默认规则可以产生一种禀赋效应,使员工更看重某些权利,因为他们在第一时间就被授予了这些权利。同样,雇主或法律设定的储蓄计划的默认规则似乎对员工的行为有很大影响。当默认规则影响偏好和行为时,传统的经济分析似乎是不确定的;任何一个默认规则都可以是有效的。在就业法中,对分配后果的分析也表明,很难决定支持哪条默认规则,因为规则的任何改变都不太可能产生重大的再分配效果。尽管如此,在某些情况下,改变默认规则可以对工人的福利产生理想的影响。一个核心问题是,默认规则的粘性是否反映了价值观的真正变化,还是员工的困惑或讨价还价策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Switching the Default Rule
There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
8.30%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: The New York University Law Review is a generalist journal publishing legal scholarship in all areas, including legal theory and policy, environmental law, legal history, international law, and more. Each year, our six issues contain cutting-edge legal scholarship written by professors, judges, and legal practitioners, as well as Notes written by members of the Law Review.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信