基于进化博弈的流域水生态治理与补偿研究

IF 2.1 4区 环境科学与生态学 Q2 ENGINEERING, CIVIL
Yiwen Fu, Gang He, Shuhang Zhao, Huaiying Jiang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

生态补偿是缓解流域水生态治理的有效途径。考虑到公众参与行为,本文构建了公众、企业和地方政府三方的演化博弈模型,分析了各参与方战略选择的演化稳定性,并讨论了各种因素对三方战略选择的影响。结合区域数据,利用Matlab R2018b对淮河流域各主体策略在不同情况下的演变趋势进行模拟分析。研究发现:(1)政府加大奖惩力度显著促进了公众参与和企业对污染的主动治理,但加大奖惩力度不利于地方政府自身监管责任的履行。(2)增加薪酬和激励金额是促进公众参与的有效途径。(3)声誉收益、声誉损失和奖惩之和大于负面治理的额外收益与公司治理成本之差,从而保证企业主动治理污染。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on watershed water ecological management and compensation based on evolutionary game
Ecological compensation is an effective way to alleviate watershed water ecological management. Considering the behavior of public participation, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the public, enterprises, and local governments, analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategic choice of each participant, and discusses the influence of various factors on the strategic choice of the three parties. Combined with regional data, Matlab R2018b is used to simulate and analyze the evolution trend of each subject strategy in the Huaihe River Basin under different situations. The study found that: (1) The government's increase in rewards and punishments has significantly promoted public participation and enterprises' active governance of pollution, but increasing rewards and punishments are not conducive to local governments' own performance of regulatory responsibilities. (2) Increasing the amount of compensation and incentives is an effective way to promote public participation. (3) The sum of reputation gains, reputation losses, and rewards and punishments is greater than the difference between the additional benefits of negative governance and the cost of corporate governance, so as to ensure that enterprises actively control pollution.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
21.10%
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