教师养老金正常成本的交叉补贴:以CalSTRS为例

Robert M. Costrell, Josh B. McGee
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在传统的固定收益养老金计划下,每年的缴款按工资的统一百分比设定,为累积福利提供资金。正常的成本率掩盖了个人福利成本的巨大差异,造成了广泛和不透明的交叉补贴模式。我们对所有进入和退出年龄的雇主缴款的交叉补贴进行了全面分析。赢家和输家的收益和损失加起来一定是零,我们在之前的一些研究中解释了为什么它们不是零,这些研究声称几乎所有的教师都是加州教师退休制度的赢家。相反,我们发现所有进入者中约有三分之二是失败者。失败者获得的福利平均年雇主成本为工资的0.8%,而赢家为5.7%。实际上,这是一个差别很大、但不透明的雇主与雇员供款匹配的体系,与统一匹配的退休账户计划不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cross-Subsidization of Teacher Pension Normal Cost: The Case of CalSTRS
Under traditional defined benefit pension plans, annual contributions are set at a uniform percentage of pay to fund accruing benefits. That normal cost rate masks wide variation in the cost of individual benefits, generating an extensive and non-transparent pattern of cross-subsidization. We provide a comprehensive analysis of cross-subsidies in employer contributions across all entry and exit ages. The gains and losses of winners and losers must add up to zero, and we explain why they do not in some previous work, which claims that nearly all teachers are winners in the California Teachers Retirement System. To the contrary, we find about two-thirds of all entrants are losers. The losers earn benefits with an average annual employer cost of 0.8 percent of pay, vs. 5.7 percent for the winners. In effect, this is a system of widely varying, but non-transparent employer matches to the employee contribution, unlike a retirement account plan with a uniform match.
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