Instrumentalization of law as a socially constituted sign-system

In this Special Issue, thenotionof “socially constituted sign-system” is beingexplored within broad philosophical, linguistic and legal contexts. It is suggested that the socially constituted sign-system represents several types of instrumentalization of law, as a salient perspective associated with the philosophy of semiotics, legal translation issues and the recent contributions to legal language and law. Instrumentalizing law is not merely a response that permits the exchange of signs, but it leads to a cognitive system generating, modifying or transplanting signs from one space to another. Accordingly, the role of legal actors, jurilinguists, legal translators and legal semioticians cannot be constituted of a merely exchange of signs. This exchange proceeds from a cognitive system that detects, analyzes,modifies and transfers signs fromone socially constituted sign-system to another. Although it may seem easy to transfer knowledge to another system, it requires the actor to be capable of incorporating, influencing and acting on this knowledge so that the initial content can be understood and accessible to other communities. As a consequence, linguistic, legal and semiotic skills have to allow constructing a transition between twodifferent cultures, permitting the second one to understand the first one. It implies “an overlapping of segments of disciplines, a recombination of knowledge in new specialized fields” (Dogan 1997, p. 435). Any transfer of knowledge in suchnewfieldsmust take into account the effectiveness of communication, otherwise the transfer is defective and the process of knowledge acquisition is not in compliance with the intent of the message producers. Furthermore, the instrumentalization of law is pivotal for rights and obligations’ observance. Actors need law, which is comprehensible, accessible and socially acceptable, not to feel the urge or temptation to circumvent it or look for loopholes.