{"title":"布伦塔诺论科学哲学与实证主义*","authors":"Flávio Vieira Curvello","doi":"10.1590/0100-512x2021n15002fvc","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one. The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano’s writings on Comte’s positivism.","PeriodicalId":52055,"journal":{"name":"Kriterion-Revista de Filosofia","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"BRENTANO ON SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY AND POSITIVISM*\",\"authors\":\"Flávio Vieira Curvello\",\"doi\":\"10.1590/0100-512x2021n15002fvc\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one. The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano’s writings on Comte’s positivism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":52055,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kriterion-Revista de Filosofia\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kriterion-Revista de Filosofia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2021n15002fvc\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kriterion-Revista de Filosofia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2021n15002fvc","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one. The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano’s writings on Comte’s positivism.
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