布伦塔诺论科学哲学与实证主义*

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY
Flávio Vieira Curvello
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文分析了布伦塔诺的第四次适应论,认为哲学方法应该是自然科学方法。本文的意义可以通过考察布伦塔诺关于自然科学与人文科学之间关系的观点来初步评估。在这场辩论中,他对方法论统一的论证表明,他实际上主张的是一种科学知识的总体观念,这种观念不仅局限于已经被公认为科学的领域,而且也可以应用于哲学领域。布伦塔诺关于孔德实证主义的著作提供了对这一观点更全面的理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
BRENTANO ON SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY AND POSITIVISM*
ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one. The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano’s writings on Comte’s positivism.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
审稿时长
28 weeks
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