{"title":"贿赂的艺术!肯尼亚交通检查站和路障警察腐败分析","authors":"Gedion Onyango","doi":"10.1080/03906701.2022.2038845","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The discreetness of street-level corruption resides in somewhat coded languages, techniques, networks and trust (solidarity) by key players. The newcomers become indoctrinated as the oldtimers, found at different levels of the police hierarchy, acting as the gatekeepers. Therefore, bribery occurs within a syndicate requiring privileged knowledge, coping strategies, and a network that would descriptively qualify as the art of bribery. Dissidence comes with a greater cost. This paper shows how Kenyan police corruption and behaviour at checkpoints occurs within a syndicate underpinned by policing culture and loosely regulated institutional environments. Traffic policing features a well-established and expansive network of institutionalised corruption regulated by the rules-of-the game where each party play their parts. Motorists pay bribes to circumvent traffic regulations or be on the right terms with corrupt officers while the police maximise illicit incomes for personal and institutional gains. The unstructured public transport and overlapping regulations exacerbate corruption at the roadblocks, creating a corruption complex and spiral effects between the police and motorists. This discussion also indicates the incompetence of police personnel and citizen agency deficits in anti-corruption reforms in Africa. Most importantly, the paper shows that tighter traffic regulations unexpectedly produces and legitimises corruption in weaker regulatory systems.","PeriodicalId":46079,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Sociology-Revue Internationale de Sociologie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The art of bribery! Analysis of police corruption at traffic checkpoints and roadblocks in Kenya\",\"authors\":\"Gedion Onyango\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/03906701.2022.2038845\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT The discreetness of street-level corruption resides in somewhat coded languages, techniques, networks and trust (solidarity) by key players. The newcomers become indoctrinated as the oldtimers, found at different levels of the police hierarchy, acting as the gatekeepers. Therefore, bribery occurs within a syndicate requiring privileged knowledge, coping strategies, and a network that would descriptively qualify as the art of bribery. Dissidence comes with a greater cost. This paper shows how Kenyan police corruption and behaviour at checkpoints occurs within a syndicate underpinned by policing culture and loosely regulated institutional environments. Traffic policing features a well-established and expansive network of institutionalised corruption regulated by the rules-of-the game where each party play their parts. Motorists pay bribes to circumvent traffic regulations or be on the right terms with corrupt officers while the police maximise illicit incomes for personal and institutional gains. The unstructured public transport and overlapping regulations exacerbate corruption at the roadblocks, creating a corruption complex and spiral effects between the police and motorists. This discussion also indicates the incompetence of police personnel and citizen agency deficits in anti-corruption reforms in Africa. Most importantly, the paper shows that tighter traffic regulations unexpectedly produces and legitimises corruption in weaker regulatory systems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46079,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Sociology-Revue Internationale de Sociologie\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-02-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Sociology-Revue Internationale de Sociologie\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2022.2038845\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"SOCIOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Sociology-Revue Internationale de Sociologie","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2022.2038845","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"SOCIOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The art of bribery! Analysis of police corruption at traffic checkpoints and roadblocks in Kenya
ABSTRACT The discreetness of street-level corruption resides in somewhat coded languages, techniques, networks and trust (solidarity) by key players. The newcomers become indoctrinated as the oldtimers, found at different levels of the police hierarchy, acting as the gatekeepers. Therefore, bribery occurs within a syndicate requiring privileged knowledge, coping strategies, and a network that would descriptively qualify as the art of bribery. Dissidence comes with a greater cost. This paper shows how Kenyan police corruption and behaviour at checkpoints occurs within a syndicate underpinned by policing culture and loosely regulated institutional environments. Traffic policing features a well-established and expansive network of institutionalised corruption regulated by the rules-of-the game where each party play their parts. Motorists pay bribes to circumvent traffic regulations or be on the right terms with corrupt officers while the police maximise illicit incomes for personal and institutional gains. The unstructured public transport and overlapping regulations exacerbate corruption at the roadblocks, creating a corruption complex and spiral effects between the police and motorists. This discussion also indicates the incompetence of police personnel and citizen agency deficits in anti-corruption reforms in Africa. Most importantly, the paper shows that tighter traffic regulations unexpectedly produces and legitimises corruption in weaker regulatory systems.
期刊介绍:
International Review of Sociology is the oldest journal in the field of sociology, founded in 1893 by Ren Worms. Now the property of Rome University, its direction has been entrusted to the Faculty of Statistics. This choice is a deliberate one and falls into line with the traditional orientation of the journal as well as of the Institut International de Sociologie. The latter was the world"s first international academic organisation of sociology which started as an association of contributors to International Review of Sociology. Entrusting the journal to the Faculty of Statistics reinforces the view that sociology is not conceived apart from economics, history, demography, anthropology and social psychology.