{"title":"制裁与反制裁之外:审视对可持续竞争的影响及中国的应对","authors":"Tianjie Gu, Jun Zhao","doi":"10.1515/ijld-2023-2005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Unilateral economic sanctions are increasingly utilized as a tool for strategic competition among states. The lack of stringent regulations in international law has encouraged states to counter such sanctions by enacting domestic legislatures such as blocking and anti-sanction laws. The complex network of sanctions, blocking statutes, and anti-sanctions has rendered cross-border trade and investment activities more challenging. Sustainable development has a competitive dimension, which requires states and entities to be commercially competitive and to pursue sustainable development goals. Unfortunately, the abuse of sanctions and anti-sanctions, as prognosticated by the Hawk-Dove game theory, has promoted lawfare instead of healthy competition among states. Research has shown that the abuse of these sanctions and anti-sanctions has worsened competitive patterns among nations, leading to a decrease in their resilience ability and severely damaging sustainable development goals. In recent years, China has faced increased pressure from economic sanctions due to trade frictions with other regions, particularly the United States. This paper aims to examine China’s approach in responding to unilateral economic sanctions, supplemented by an analysis of China’s recently enacted anti-sanction and blocking laws. This paper will also further the understanding of how states should respond to and apply unilateral economic sanctions through international law based on China’s experience.","PeriodicalId":55934,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Legal Discourse","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Beyond sanctions and anti-sanctions: examining the impact on sustainable competition and China’s responses\",\"authors\":\"Tianjie Gu, Jun Zhao\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/ijld-2023-2005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Unilateral economic sanctions are increasingly utilized as a tool for strategic competition among states. The lack of stringent regulations in international law has encouraged states to counter such sanctions by enacting domestic legislatures such as blocking and anti-sanction laws. The complex network of sanctions, blocking statutes, and anti-sanctions has rendered cross-border trade and investment activities more challenging. Sustainable development has a competitive dimension, which requires states and entities to be commercially competitive and to pursue sustainable development goals. Unfortunately, the abuse of sanctions and anti-sanctions, as prognosticated by the Hawk-Dove game theory, has promoted lawfare instead of healthy competition among states. Research has shown that the abuse of these sanctions and anti-sanctions has worsened competitive patterns among nations, leading to a decrease in their resilience ability and severely damaging sustainable development goals. In recent years, China has faced increased pressure from economic sanctions due to trade frictions with other regions, particularly the United States. This paper aims to examine China’s approach in responding to unilateral economic sanctions, supplemented by an analysis of China’s recently enacted anti-sanction and blocking laws. This paper will also further the understanding of how states should respond to and apply unilateral economic sanctions through international law based on China’s experience.\",\"PeriodicalId\":55934,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Legal Discourse\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Legal Discourse\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/ijld-2023-2005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LINGUISTICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Legal Discourse","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ijld-2023-2005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LINGUISTICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Beyond sanctions and anti-sanctions: examining the impact on sustainable competition and China’s responses
Abstract Unilateral economic sanctions are increasingly utilized as a tool for strategic competition among states. The lack of stringent regulations in international law has encouraged states to counter such sanctions by enacting domestic legislatures such as blocking and anti-sanction laws. The complex network of sanctions, blocking statutes, and anti-sanctions has rendered cross-border trade and investment activities more challenging. Sustainable development has a competitive dimension, which requires states and entities to be commercially competitive and to pursue sustainable development goals. Unfortunately, the abuse of sanctions and anti-sanctions, as prognosticated by the Hawk-Dove game theory, has promoted lawfare instead of healthy competition among states. Research has shown that the abuse of these sanctions and anti-sanctions has worsened competitive patterns among nations, leading to a decrease in their resilience ability and severely damaging sustainable development goals. In recent years, China has faced increased pressure from economic sanctions due to trade frictions with other regions, particularly the United States. This paper aims to examine China’s approach in responding to unilateral economic sanctions, supplemented by an analysis of China’s recently enacted anti-sanction and blocking laws. This paper will also further the understanding of how states should respond to and apply unilateral economic sanctions through international law based on China’s experience.