当危害减轻降低消费效益时,产品安全和危害减轻激励

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
F. Baumann, Tim Friehe
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引用次数: 2

摘要

为了减少其产品对消费者造成的预期伤害,企业可以在销售前投资于产品的安全性,或者在产品风险成为现实的情况下减轻销售后的伤害。售后减害干扰了消费者的产品使用,降低了消费者的消费效益。我们将企业对安全投资和减轻损害的激励描述为企业负债水平的函数。虽然售后缓解激励措施因责任而扩大,但售前产品安全是责任的u型函数,使两种减少危害工具在低责任水平上互为替代,在高责任水平上互为补充。为了有效地减轻损害,责任必须少于全部。进一步降低责任水平以公司利润为代价提高了产品安全。(凝胶k13, d42)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Product Safety and Harm-Mitigation Incentives When Mitigation Lowers Consumption Benefits
To reduce the expected harm its product causes to consumers, a firm can invest in a product’s safety before sale or mitigate harm after sale in the event product risks materialize. After-sale harm mitigation interferes with consumers’ product use and reduces consumption benefits. We describe a firm’s incentives for safety investments and harm mitigation as a function of the level of the firm’s liability. Whereas post-sale mitigation incentives are scaled up by liability, pre-sale product safety is a U-shaped function of liability, making the two harm reduction instruments substitutes at low levels of liability and complements at high levels. To induce efficient harm mitigation, liability must be less than full. Further reducing the level of liability improves product safety at the cost of the firm’s profits. (JEL K13, D42).
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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