Kareen E. Brown , Fayez A. Elayan , Jingyu Li , Emad Mohammad , Parunchana Pacharn , Zhefeng Frank Liu
{"title":"豁免或不豁免非加速申报者遵守《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》第404(b)条的审计师认证要求","authors":"Kareen E. Brown , Fayez A. Elayan , Jingyu Li , Emad Mohammad , Parunchana Pacharn , Zhefeng Frank Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.racreg.2016.09.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the stock market reaction to the SEC announcement to permanently exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Mandatory compliance with auditor attestation under Section 404(b) is highly controversial. Using a sample of non-accelerated issuers for 2006–2011, we find a negative market reaction to the November 4, 2009 exemption announcement. However, most of the negative returns accrue to non-accelerated filers that do not voluntarily comply with Section 404(b), suggesting that auditor attestation enhances firm value. The use of a Big 4 auditor, strong analyst following, and superior internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) are associated with positive/less negative market responses. Voluntary compliers with Section 404(b) are more likely to have a Big 4 auditor, stronger analyst coverage, effective ICFR, stronger firm performance and lower information asymmetry. Our results are consistent with firms using voluntary compliance with SOX 404(b) as a signal of superior operating performance and ICFR quality to overcome information asymmetry and therefore mitigate the negative valuation impact of the permanent exemption from auditor attestation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101074,"journal":{"name":"Research in Accounting Regulation","volume":"28 2","pages":"Pages 86-95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.racreg.2016.09.005","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"To exempt or not to exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with the auditor attestation requirement of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act\",\"authors\":\"Kareen E. Brown , Fayez A. Elayan , Jingyu Li , Emad Mohammad , Parunchana Pacharn , Zhefeng Frank Liu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.racreg.2016.09.005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine the stock market reaction to the SEC announcement to permanently exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Mandatory compliance with auditor attestation under Section 404(b) is highly controversial. Using a sample of non-accelerated issuers for 2006–2011, we find a negative market reaction to the November 4, 2009 exemption announcement. However, most of the negative returns accrue to non-accelerated filers that do not voluntarily comply with Section 404(b), suggesting that auditor attestation enhances firm value. The use of a Big 4 auditor, strong analyst following, and superior internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) are associated with positive/less negative market responses. Voluntary compliers with Section 404(b) are more likely to have a Big 4 auditor, stronger analyst coverage, effective ICFR, stronger firm performance and lower information asymmetry. Our results are consistent with firms using voluntary compliance with SOX 404(b) as a signal of superior operating performance and ICFR quality to overcome information asymmetry and therefore mitigate the negative valuation impact of the permanent exemption from auditor attestation.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101074,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Research in Accounting Regulation\",\"volume\":\"28 2\",\"pages\":\"Pages 86-95\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.racreg.2016.09.005\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Research in Accounting Regulation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1052045716300200\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Accounting Regulation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1052045716300200","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
To exempt or not to exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with the auditor attestation requirement of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
We examine the stock market reaction to the SEC announcement to permanently exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Mandatory compliance with auditor attestation under Section 404(b) is highly controversial. Using a sample of non-accelerated issuers for 2006–2011, we find a negative market reaction to the November 4, 2009 exemption announcement. However, most of the negative returns accrue to non-accelerated filers that do not voluntarily comply with Section 404(b), suggesting that auditor attestation enhances firm value. The use of a Big 4 auditor, strong analyst following, and superior internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) are associated with positive/less negative market responses. Voluntary compliers with Section 404(b) are more likely to have a Big 4 auditor, stronger analyst coverage, effective ICFR, stronger firm performance and lower information asymmetry. Our results are consistent with firms using voluntary compliance with SOX 404(b) as a signal of superior operating performance and ICFR quality to overcome information asymmetry and therefore mitigate the negative valuation impact of the permanent exemption from auditor attestation.