监管对银行绩效的影响:来自不连续检查频率的证据

Q4 Social Sciences

Banking Law Journal Pub Date : 2014-02-18 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2135017

Marcelo Rezende, Jason Wu

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引用次数: 31

摘要

本文利用监管要求的最低检查频率的不连续性来估计监管对银行业绩的因果影响。在银行资产价值随时间变化的情况下，这种频率是不连续的，这使我们能够打破监管与绩效之间的内生性，并将检查的影响与也由资产阈值触发的其他银行政策的混淆效应区分开来。我们发现更频繁的检查通过减少贷款损失和拖欠来增加盈利能力。这表明，监管机构限制了银行面临的风险，从而限制了银行在风险资产上的损失。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Effects of Supervision on Bank Performance: Evidence from Discontinuous Examination Frequencies

This paper estimates causal effects of supervision on bank performance using discontinuities in the minimum frequency of examinations required by regulation. This frequency is discontinuous at a value of bank assets that varied over time, allowing us to break the endogeneity between supervision and performance and to separate the effects of examinations from confounding effects of other banking policies that are triggered by asset thresholds too. We find that more frequent examinations increase profitability by decreasing loan losses and delinquencies. This suggests that supervisors limit the risks that banks are exposed to and, consequently, limit banks’ losses on risky assets.

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来源期刊

Banking Law Journal Social Sciences-Law

CiteScore

0.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Banking Law Journal helps you keep in touch with the leading thinking regarding the latest developments in banking law. It covers every area of major interest to bankers and attorneys, with practical material for bank counsel use, articles of current importance by recognized experts, plus digests of important cases from every jurisdiction. Leading practitioners share their cutting-edge analysis and give you practical guidance in all areas of banking law.