TwinVisor:用于ARM的硬件隔离机密虚拟机

Q3 Computer Science
Ding Li, Zeyu Mi, Yubin Xia, B. Zang, Haibo Chen, Haibing Guan
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引用次数: 19

摘要

Confidential VM为对云提供商信任有限的云租户提供了一个隔离的执行环境,最近已部署在AWS和Azure等主要云上。然而,当ARM在云数据中心变得越来越流行时,现有的机密虚拟机设计主要利用专门的x86硬件扩展(例如,AMD SEV和Intel TDX)来隔离共享管理程序上的虚拟机。本文提出了TwinVisor,这是第一个在ARM平台上实现硬件强制隔离机密虚拟机的系统。TwinVisor利用成熟的ARM TrustZone运行两个隔离的管理程序,一个在安全世界(本文称为S-visor),另一个在正常世界(称为N-visor),分别支持普通vm和机密vm。我们的设计不是从头开始构建一个新的S-visor,而是将保护与资源管理解耦,并重用一个成熟的N-visor的大多数功能来最小化S-visor的大小。我们已经构建了两个TwinVisor原型:一个在官方ARM模拟器上启用S-EL2以验证功能正确性,另一个在ARM开发板上评估性能。S-visor包含5.8K个LoC, N-visor为KVM引入906个LoC更改。根据我们的评估,TwinVisor可以将未修改的虚拟机映像作为机密虚拟机运行,同时对SMP虚拟机上的各种实际工作负载产生不到5%的性能开销。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
TwinVisor: Hardware-isolated Confidential Virtual Machines for ARM
Confidential VM, which offers an isolated execution environment for cloud tenants with limited trust in the cloud provider, has recently been deployed in major clouds such as AWS and Azure. However, while ARM has become increasingly popular in cloud data centers, existing confidential VM designs mainly leverage specialized x86 hardware extensions (e.g., AMD SEV and Intel TDX) to isolate VMs upon a shared hypervisor. This paper proposes TwinVisor, the first system that enables the hardware-enforced isolation of confidential VMs on ARM platforms. TwinVisor takes advantage of the mature ARM TrustZone to run two isolated hypervisors, one in the secure world (called S-visor in this paper) and the other in the normal world (called N-visor), to support normal VMs and confidential VMs respectively. Instead of building a new S-visor from scratch, our design decouples protection from resource management, and reuses most functionalities of a full-fledged N-visor to minimize the size of S-visor. We have built two prototypes of TwinVisor: one on an official ARM simulator with S-EL2 enabled to validate functional correctness and the other on an ARM development board to evaluate performance. The S-visor comprises 5.8K LoCs while the N-visor introduces 906 LoC changes to KVM. According to our evaluation, TwinVisor can run unmodified VM images as confidential VMs while incurring less than 5% performance overhead for various real-world workloads on SMP VMs.
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来源期刊
Operating Systems Review (ACM)
Operating Systems Review (ACM) Computer Science-Computer Networks and Communications
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: Operating Systems Review (OSR) is a publication of the ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems (SIGOPS), whose scope of interest includes: computer operating systems and architecture for multiprogramming, multiprocessing, and time sharing; resource management; evaluation and simulation; reliability, integrity, and security of data; communications among computing processors; and computer system modeling and analysis.
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