银行监督防止管理层拖延:来自收益公告时间的证据

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
C. Banks
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究了银行监控在收益公告发布时机中的作用。经理们已经被证明会拖延和推迟公开发布关于收益的坏消息。我发现,银行对这种拖延向公众披露收益的管理进行了约束和防止。此外,我发现,在存在银行贷款关系的情况下,市场对公开发布收益信息的延迟更为宽容。因此,只有当银行贷款关系不存在时,才会观察到伴随盈利信息延迟发布的负异常回报。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bank Monitoring Prevents Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements
Abstract I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
10.50%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: In Journal of Behavioral Finance , leaders in many fields are brought together to address the implications of current work on individual and group emotion, cognition, and action for the behavior of investment markets. They include specialists in personality, social, and clinical psychology; psychiatry; organizational behavior; accounting; marketing; sociology; anthropology; behavioral economics; finance; and the multidisciplinary study of judgment and decision making. The journal will foster debate among groups who have keen insights into the behavioral patterns of markets but have not historically published in the more traditional financial and economic journals. Further, it will stimulate new interdisciplinary research and theory that will build a body of knowledge about the psychological influences on investment market fluctuations. The most obvious benefit will be a new understanding of investment markets that can greatly improve investment decision making. Another benefit will be the opportunity for behavioral scientists to expand the scope of their studies via the use of the enormous databases that document behavior in investment markets.
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