{"title":"俱乐部经济中的外部性定价","authors":"SUZANNE SCOTCHMER","doi":"10.1006/reco.1996.0023","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper shows that competitive forces in club economies lead to admission prices that can be decomposed as anonymous linear prices on externality-producing attributes, where each member pays the same amount per unit attribute contributed. The externalities prices are sufficient to cover the costs of services provided within the club. The latter can be interpreted as a variant on the “Henry George Theorem”.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101136,"journal":{"name":"Ricerche Economiche","volume":"50 4","pages":"Pages 347-366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1996-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1006/reco.1996.0023","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Externality pricing in club economies\",\"authors\":\"SUZANNE SCOTCHMER\",\"doi\":\"10.1006/reco.1996.0023\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The paper shows that competitive forces in club economies lead to admission prices that can be decomposed as anonymous linear prices on externality-producing attributes, where each member pays the same amount per unit attribute contributed. The externalities prices are sufficient to cover the costs of services provided within the club. The latter can be interpreted as a variant on the “Henry George Theorem”.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101136,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ricerche Economiche\",\"volume\":\"50 4\",\"pages\":\"Pages 347-366\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1996-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1006/reco.1996.0023\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ricerche Economiche\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0035505496900233\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ricerche Economiche","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0035505496900233","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper shows that competitive forces in club economies lead to admission prices that can be decomposed as anonymous linear prices on externality-producing attributes, where each member pays the same amount per unit attribute contributed. The externalities prices are sufficient to cover the costs of services provided within the club. The latter can be interpreted as a variant on the “Henry George Theorem”.
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