有许多参赛者的竞赛奖品

Michael Menietti
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摘要

我们描述了在期望结果、期望最大结果和期望第m个最高结果的组织者目标下,全酬竞赛的最优奖金分配。对于小型比赛来说,多个奖项可能是最优的,但随着参赛者数量的增加,单个奖项就变得最优了。大量进入者并非在所有情况下都是最优的。每个可行整数对于某个代价函数都是最优的。我们描述了竞赛结果的极限值;在线性生成的情况下是这样在凹/凸的情况下是有界的。在所有情况下,极限值都有界远离零。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Prizes in Contests with Many Entrants
We characterize the optimal prize distribution in an all-pay contest under organizer objectives of expected outcome, expected maximum outcome, and expected mth highest outcome. Multiple prizes can be optimal for small contests, but as the number of entrants grows large a single prize becomes optimal. A large number of entrants is not optimal in all cases. Every feasible integer is optimal for some cost function. We characterize the limiting value of contest outcomes; exactly in the case of linear production and up to bounds in the concave/convex case. In all cases the limiting value is bounded away from zero.
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