针对“免费增值”应用盈利的价格促销

Julian Runge, Harikesh S. Nair, Jonathan Levav
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引用次数: 1

摘要

数字产品的“免费增值”模式包括免费销售产品的基础版本,并向付费用户提供高级产品功能。这种模式的成功取决于能否将免费用户转化为付费用户。价格促销(或“销售”)通常用于免费增值模式,以诱导用户转换。然而,使消费者暴露于这种跨期价格变化的因果效应尚不清楚。虽然销售可以产生有益的短期转换,但如果消费者在短期内以低价替代购买,或将其作为产品质量低下的信号,那么从长期来看,销售可能是有害的。这些长期的担忧可能会在免费增值应用中凸显出来,在这些应用中,基础版本是免费出售的,因此销售对整体产品组合构成了极大的降价。我们与免费电子游戏的销售商合作,随机分配进入的用户群体,并控制他们在何种条件下开启或关闭游戏内置购买的促销活动。我们用半年的时间观察完整的用户行为,包括游戏内商品的购买和消费,这与现有的许多文献不同,它使我们能够直接评估随着时间的推移消费中可能出现的替代行为。我们发现治疗组的转化率和收益有所提高;并没有发现有害的跨期替代或价格变化对质量的负面影响的证据,这表明促销是有利可图的。我们推测,基础产品的零价格使得它的消费几乎没有成本,再加上基础产品和高级功能之间的互补性,可以帮助解释这一点。从某种程度上说,这适用于免费模式,本文所述的促销活动的积极影响可能更普遍。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Price Promotions for "Freemium" App Monetization
The “freemium” model for digital goods involves selling a base version of the product for free, and making premium product features available to users only on payment. The success of the model is predicated on the ability to profitably convert free users to paying ones. Price promotions (or “sales”) are often used in freemium to induce the conversion. However, the causal effect of exposing consumers to such inter-temporal price variation is unclear. While sales can generate beneficial short-run conversion, they may be harmful in the long-run if consumers inter-temporally substitute purchases to periods with low prices, or use them as signals of low product quality. These long-run concerns may be accentuated in freemium apps, where the base version is sold for free, so that sales form extreme price cuts on the overall product combination. We work with the seller of a free-to-play video game to randomize entering cohorts of users into treatment and control conditions in which promotions for in-game purchases are turned on or off. We observe complete user behavior for half a year, including purchases and consumption of in-game goods, which, in contrast to much of the extant literature, enables us to assess possible substitution over time in consumption directly. We find that conversion and revenue improve in the treatment group; and detect no evidence of harmful inter-temporal substitution or negative inferences about quality from exposure to price variation, suggesting that promotions are profitable. We conjecture that the zero price of the base product that makes its consumption virtually costless, combined with the complementarity between the base product and premium features can help explain this. To the extent that this holds across freemium contexts, the positive effects of promotions documented here may hold more generally.
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