{"title":"一种无可辩驳的建构主义","authors":"D. Goswick","doi":"10.22381/am1820191","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I distinguish 20th century Constructivists (e.g. Goodman, Putnam) whose anti-Realism is global and is motivated by epistemic and semantic concerns about Realism from 21st century Constructivists (e.g. Einheuser, Goswick, Sidelle) whose anti-Realism is local and is motivated by specific metaphysical concerns about modality. I argue that the 21st century Constructivist program is plausible in a way the 20th century Constructivist program is not. In particular, I argue that 21st century Constructivism is immune to the anti- Constructivist arguments Devitt presents in Truth and Realism.","PeriodicalId":38178,"journal":{"name":"Analysis and Metaphysics","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A DEVITT-PROOF CONSTRUCTIVISM\",\"authors\":\"D. Goswick\",\"doi\":\"10.22381/am1820191\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I distinguish 20th century Constructivists (e.g. Goodman, Putnam) whose anti-Realism is global and is motivated by epistemic and semantic concerns about Realism from 21st century Constructivists (e.g. Einheuser, Goswick, Sidelle) whose anti-Realism is local and is motivated by specific metaphysical concerns about modality. I argue that the 21st century Constructivist program is plausible in a way the 20th century Constructivist program is not. In particular, I argue that 21st century Constructivism is immune to the anti- Constructivist arguments Devitt presents in Truth and Realism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38178,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analysis and Metaphysics\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analysis and Metaphysics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22381/am1820191\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analysis and Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22381/am1820191","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
I distinguish 20th century Constructivists (e.g. Goodman, Putnam) whose anti-Realism is global and is motivated by epistemic and semantic concerns about Realism from 21st century Constructivists (e.g. Einheuser, Goswick, Sidelle) whose anti-Realism is local and is motivated by specific metaphysical concerns about modality. I argue that the 21st century Constructivist program is plausible in a way the 20th century Constructivist program is not. In particular, I argue that 21st century Constructivism is immune to the anti- Constructivist arguments Devitt presents in Truth and Realism.