异质性策略、信息不对称和单向研发溢出下动态双寡头古诺博弈的均衡稳定性

IF 2.4 Q2 ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL
Jianjun Long, Fenglian Wang
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要有限理性、信息不对称和研发溢出在垄断市场中广泛存在,并被大量文献分别研究;然而,在有限理性企业的寡头垄断博弈中,研究R&D溢出效应和信息不对称的研究却很少。考虑到研发溢出只从研发领导者流向研发追随者,本文提出了一个具有异质期望和信息不对称的双寡头古诺博弈。在模型中,我们设计了一个具有边际成本私有信息的企业,并引入了研发溢出系数。有趣的发现表明:(1)在完全理性的静态双寡头古诺博弈中,具有私有信息的企业1的均衡产出与研发溢出和高边际成本概率负相关,而企业2的均衡产出与二者正相关。(ii)在信息不对称和异质性期望的动态双寡头古诺博弈中,如果企业分别采用自适应期望和naïve期望,纳什均衡总是全局渐近稳定的;当分别使用自适应期望和梯度动态期望时,纳什均衡在一定条件下趋于局部渐近稳定。此外,高边际成本或研发溢出的概率越大,垄断市场的波动性越大,而企业1的技术创新效率越高,有利于产品市场的稳定性。本文的研究对寡头垄断市场中同质产品的技术创新活动具有一定的理论和实践意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Equilibrium stability of dynamic duopoly Cournot game under heterogeneous strategies, asymmetric information, and one-way R&D spillovers
Abstract Bounded rationality, asymmetric information, and R&D spillovers are widely existed in monopoly markets, and they have been researched separately by a large number of literatures; however, there are few works that discussed both R&D spillovers and asymmetric information in oligopolistic games with bounded rational firms. Considering that R&D spillovers only flow from the R&D leader to the R&D follower, a duopoly Cournot game with heterogeneous expectations and asymmetric information is presented. In our model, a firm with private information of his marginal cost is designed, and the coefficient of R&D spillovers is introduced. Interesting findings show the following: (i) In a static duopoly Cournot game with perfect rationality, the equilibrium output of firm 1 with private information is negatively related to R&D spillovers and the probability of high marginal cost, while firm 2’s equilibrium output is positively correlated with them. (ii) In a dynamic duopoly Cournot game with asymmetric information and heterogeneous expectations, if firms adopt adaptive expectation and naïve expectation respectively, the Nash equilibrium is always globally asymptotically stable; if they use adaptive expectation and gradient dynamical expectation respectively, the Nash equilibrium tends to be locally asymptotically stable under certain conditions. Furthermore, the bigger the probability of high marginal cost or R&D spillovers are, the more volatile the monopoly market is, while higher technology innovation efficiency (TIE) of firm 1 is conducive to the stability of the product market. Our study would have theoretical and practical significance to the technological innovation activities of homogeneous products in oligopoly markets.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
3.60%
发文量
49
审稿时长
44 weeks
期刊介绍: The Journal of Nonlinear Engineering aims to be a platform for sharing original research results in theoretical, experimental, practical, and applied nonlinear phenomena within engineering. It serves as a forum to exchange ideas and applications of nonlinear problems across various engineering disciplines. Articles are considered for publication if they explore nonlinearities in engineering systems, offering realistic mathematical modeling, utilizing nonlinearity for new designs, stabilizing systems, understanding system behavior through nonlinearity, optimizing systems based on nonlinear interactions, and developing algorithms to harness and leverage nonlinear elements.
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