反垄断的生活

E. Miller
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引用次数: 0

摘要

关于反垄断死于去中心化区块链的报道是夸大其词。前提是合乎逻辑的:分散的市场应该减轻对反垄断法的需求,反垄断法通常解决集中市场中中央企业滥用权力和秘密勾结的问题。事实上,区块链首先通过去中心化(一种反垄断自我监管的形式)来努力防止有利于串通和垄断的市场结构。区块链社区正在辩论和决定如何实现这种自我监管,并有可能在实时和公开的情况下自主实施旨在保持去中心化的市场约束。所有这些都意味着反垄断原则在区块链上非常活跃。然而,存在一个冲突:最近对反垄断进行自我监管的努力本身可能违反了这种努力旨在先发制人的法律。本文首先确定了这种冲突,提出反垄断正在进入一个新的区块链时代,一个自我监管和透明的时代,但并非没有风险。本文随后认为,区块链背景下的自我监管努力通常会受到美国法院的谴责,比如价格操纵,而应该在理性规则下接受更充分的审查。这种自我监管的有利竞争潜力,加上复杂区块链市场的司法经验不足,证明了这种方法的必要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Antitrust Live
The reports of antitrust’s death at the hands of decentralized blockchains were an exaggeration. The premise is logical: decentralized markets should mitigate the need for antitrust laws, which typically address abuses of power by, and secret collusion among, centralized firms in concentrated markets. Indeed, blockchains strive to prevent market structures that facilitate collusion and monopolization in the first place through decentralization, a form of antitrust self-regulation. And blockchain communities are debating and deciding how to effect this self-regulation, with the potential for autonomous implementations of market constraints designed to preserve decentralization, in real time and in public. All of this means that antitrust principles are very much alive on the blockchain. However, there exists a conflict: recent efforts to self-regulate antitrust may constitute per se violations of the very laws that such efforts are intended to preempt.  The first to identify this conflict, this Article proposes that antitrust is entering a new blockchain era, one that is self-regulated and transparent, but not without risks. This Article then argues that self-regulation efforts in the blockchain context that would normally receive per se condemnation by U.S. courts, like price fixing, should instead receive more fulsome reviews under the rule of reason. The procompetitive potential of such self-regulation, combined with judicial inexperience in complex blockchain markets, warrants such an approach.
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