一个安全的伪装逻辑系列,使用制造后编程,在1V标称VDD下,在65nm CMOS中使用3.6GHz加法器原型

N. E. C. Akkaya, B. Erbagci, K. Mai
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引用次数: 20

摘要

随着集成电路制造供应链的持续全球化,确保供应链的安全变得越来越困难,这为无数的安全威胁打开了大门,例如未经授权的生产,假冒,知识产权盗窃和硬件特洛伊木马。先进的逆向工程能力构成了一个平行的和相关的威胁,例如,即使是在最先进的技术节点上制造的芯片也可以被分层、成像和分析。虽然提出了各种制造方法和伪装门,但没有一个能完全解决这些威胁,特别是在组合中。为了解决这些问题,我们使用制造后可编程伪装逻辑拓扑来同时模糊来自制造商的设计IP以及对抗逆向工程。该设计的基础是阈值电压定义(TVD)逻辑门拓扑,该拓扑仅使用不同的阈值电压植入物来确定逻辑门功能[2]。每个门具有相同的物理布局,并且使用有意定向热载子注入(HCI)对不同布尔函数使用不同的阈值电压进行制造后编程。类似的HCI技术以前被用于提高SRAM的余量,提高PUF的可靠性,以及构建trng[3][4]。该设计与标准CMOS逻辑工艺完全兼容,不需要特殊的层、结构或工艺步骤。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A secure camouflaged logic family using post-manufacturing programming with a 3.6GHz adder prototype in 65nm CMOS at 1V nominal VDD
With the continued globalization of the IC manufacturing supply chain, securing that supply chain is becoming increasingly difficult and this opens the door to a myriad of security threats such as unauthorized production, counterfeiting, IP theft, and hardware Trojan Horses. A parallel and related threat is posed by advanced reverse engineering capabilities, such that even chips manufactured at the most advanced technology nodes can be de-layered, imaged, and analyzed [1]. While various manufacturing methodologies and camouflaged gates have been proposed, none fully address these threats, especially in combination. To address these concerns, we use post-manufacturing programmable camouflaged logic topology to simultaneously obscure the design IP from the manufacturer as well as combat reverse engineering. The basis of the design is a threshold-voltage-defined (TVD) logic gate topology that solely uses different threshold voltage implants to determine the logic gate function [2]. Every gate has an identical physical layout and is post-manufacturing programmed with different threshold voltages for different Boolean functions using intentional directed hot-carrier injection (HCI). Similar intentional HCI techniques have previously been used to enhance SRAM margins, boost PUF reliability, and build TRNGs [3][4]. The design is fully compatible with standard CMOS logic processes, requiring no special layers, structures, or process steps.
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