战略资产配置中的共同顾问效应

Rob Bauer, Matteo Bonetti, Dirk Broeders
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引用次数: 2

摘要

养老基金的战略投资决策是由受托人做出的。在做出这些决定时,受托人与资产管理公司和精算师等独立顾问签订合同。这些外部顾问能否将他们的投资理念转移到与他们签订合同的养老基金上?我们使用资产管理公司和为多个养老基金提供服务的个人精算师的专有数据来回答这个问题。我们发现,尽管养老基金在负债结构、资金水平或规模上存在显著差异,但在共同资产管理公司或共同精算师存在的情况下,养老基金在战略资产配置上做出的决策相似。这种影响在私募股权、对冲基金和房地产等另类资产类别中尤为明显。如果两家养老基金在一年内将其对另类投资的战略配置增加了10个百分点,那么在其他条件相同的情况下,与同一家资产管理公司签约的第三家养老基金将其对另类投资的战略配置增加了2.5个百分点。共同顾问效应可能导致养老基金选择与其负债结构、资金比率、复杂程度或组织结构不一致的战略资产配置。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Common Advisor Effect in Strategic Asset Allocations
Strategic investment decisions in pension funds are made by trustees. In making these decisions, trustees contract independent advisors such as asset managers and actuaries. Can these external advisors transfer their investment beliefs to the pension funds they contract with? We use proprietary data with the names of asset management firms and individual actuaries that service multiple pension funds to answer this question. We find that pension funds make similar decisions on strategic asset allocations in the presence of a common asset manager or a common actuary, despite significant differences in their liability structures, funding levels, or sizes. The effect is particularly strong in alternative asset classes, such as private equity, hedge funds, and real estate. If two pension funds increase their strategic allocation to alternatives by 10 percentage points in one year, then a third pension fund that contracts the same asset manager increases its strategic allocation to alternatives by 2.5 percentage points, all else being equal. The common-advisor effect might lead a pension fund to select a strategic asset allocation that is not in line with its liability structure, funding ratio, sophistication level, or organizational structure.
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