On goal-directed provability in classical logic

One of the key features of logic programming is the notion of goal-directed provability. In intuitionistic logic, the notion of uniform proof has been used as a proof-theoretic characterization of this property. Whilst the connections between intuitionistic logic and computation are well known, there is no reason per se why a similar notion cannot be given in classical logic. In this paper we show that there are two notions of goal-directed proof in classical logic, both of which are suitably weaker than that for intuitionistic logic. We show the completeness of this class of proofs for certain fragments, which thus form logic programming languages. As there are more possible variations on the notion of goal-directed provability in classical logic, there is a greater diversity of classical logic programming languages than intuitionistic ones. In particular, we show how logic programs may contain disjunctions in this setting. This provides a proof-theoretic basis for disjunctive logic programs, as well as characterising the “disjunctive” nature of answer substitutions for such programs in terms of the provability properties of the classical connectives Λ and Λ.