{"title":"谷歌服务中基于cookie的隐私问题","authors":"V. Toubiana, Vincent Verdot, B. Christophe","doi":"10.1145/2133601.2133619","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"With the success of Web applications, most of our data is now stored on various third-party servers where they are processed to deliver personalized services. Naturally, we must be authenticated to access this personal information, but the use of personalized services only restricted by identification could indirectly and silently leak sensitive data. We analyzed Google Web Search access mechanisms and found that the current policy applied to session cookies could be used to retrieve users' personal data. We describe two attack schemes based on the Google's \"SID cookie\". First, we show that it permits a session fixation attack in which the victim's searches are recorded in the attacker's Google Web Search History. The second attack leverages the search personalization (based on the same SID cookie) to retrieve a part of the victim's click history and even some of her contacts. We implemented a proof of concept of the latter attack on the Firefox Web browser and conducted an experiment with ten volunteers. Thanks to this prototype we were able to recover up to 80% of the user's search click history.","PeriodicalId":90472,"journal":{"name":"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy","volume":"17 1","pages":"141-148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cookie-based privacy issues on google services\",\"authors\":\"V. Toubiana, Vincent Verdot, B. Christophe\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2133601.2133619\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"With the success of Web applications, most of our data is now stored on various third-party servers where they are processed to deliver personalized services. Naturally, we must be authenticated to access this personal information, but the use of personalized services only restricted by identification could indirectly and silently leak sensitive data. We analyzed Google Web Search access mechanisms and found that the current policy applied to session cookies could be used to retrieve users' personal data. We describe two attack schemes based on the Google's \\\"SID cookie\\\". First, we show that it permits a session fixation attack in which the victim's searches are recorded in the attacker's Google Web Search History. The second attack leverages the search personalization (based on the same SID cookie) to retrieve a part of the victim's click history and even some of her contacts. We implemented a proof of concept of the latter attack on the Firefox Web browser and conducted an experiment with ten volunteers. Thanks to this prototype we were able to recover up to 80% of the user's search click history.\",\"PeriodicalId\":90472,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"141-148\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-02-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2133601.2133619\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CODASPY : proceedings of the ... ACM conference on data and application security and privacy. ACM Conference on Data and Application Security & Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2133601.2133619","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
摘要
随着Web应用程序的成功,我们的大多数数据现在都存储在各种第三方服务器上,在这些服务器上对数据进行处理以提供个性化服务。当然,我们必须通过身份验证才能访问这些个人信息,但使用仅受身份限制的个性化服务可能会间接地、无声地泄露敏感数据。我们分析了Google Web Search访问机制,发现当前应用于会话cookie的策略可以用来检索用户的个人数据。我们描述了基于Google的“SID cookie”的两种攻击方案。首先,我们展示了它允许会话固定攻击,其中受害者的搜索记录在攻击者的Google Web搜索历史中。第二种攻击利用搜索个性化(基于相同的SID cookie)来检索受害者的部分点击历史记录,甚至是她的一些联系人。我们在Firefox Web浏览器上实现了后一种攻击的概念验证,并与10名志愿者进行了实验。多亏了这个原型,我们能够恢复高达80%的用户搜索点击历史。
With the success of Web applications, most of our data is now stored on various third-party servers where they are processed to deliver personalized services. Naturally, we must be authenticated to access this personal information, but the use of personalized services only restricted by identification could indirectly and silently leak sensitive data. We analyzed Google Web Search access mechanisms and found that the current policy applied to session cookies could be used to retrieve users' personal data. We describe two attack schemes based on the Google's "SID cookie". First, we show that it permits a session fixation attack in which the victim's searches are recorded in the attacker's Google Web Search History. The second attack leverages the search personalization (based on the same SID cookie) to retrieve a part of the victim's click history and even some of her contacts. We implemented a proof of concept of the latter attack on the Firefox Web browser and conducted an experiment with ten volunteers. Thanks to this prototype we were able to recover up to 80% of the user's search click history.