{"title":"复习游戏中的合作及一些应用","authors":"Yuichiro Kamada, Michihiro Kandori","doi":"10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The present paper provides some examples that illustrate how cooperation is achieved among rational and selfish agents when (i) they prepare their actions in advance and (ii) they have some opportunities to revise their actions. Specifically, we use the framework of revision games introduced by Kamada and Kandori [(2020). “Revision Games.” Econometrica 88: 1599–1630]. To judge the sustainability of cooperation in the examples, we show and utilise a simple and useful lemma.","PeriodicalId":45235,"journal":{"name":"Global Economic Review","volume":"25 3","pages":"329 - 348"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications\",\"authors\":\"Yuichiro Kamada, Michihiro Kandori\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT The present paper provides some examples that illustrate how cooperation is achieved among rational and selfish agents when (i) they prepare their actions in advance and (ii) they have some opportunities to revise their actions. Specifically, we use the framework of revision games introduced by Kamada and Kandori [(2020). “Revision Games.” Econometrica 88: 1599–1630]. To judge the sustainability of cooperation in the examples, we show and utilise a simple and useful lemma.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45235,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"25 3\",\"pages\":\"329 - 348\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications
ABSTRACT The present paper provides some examples that illustrate how cooperation is achieved among rational and selfish agents when (i) they prepare their actions in advance and (ii) they have some opportunities to revise their actions. Specifically, we use the framework of revision games introduced by Kamada and Kandori [(2020). “Revision Games.” Econometrica 88: 1599–1630]. To judge the sustainability of cooperation in the examples, we show and utilise a simple and useful lemma.
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