Kjell Berger, Øyvind Fimreite, Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel
{"title":"石油市场和关于二氧化碳排放的国际协议","authors":"Kjell Berger, Øyvind Fimreite, Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel","doi":"10.1016/0165-0572(92)90001-W","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to most scientists, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced significantly relative to current trends to avoid dramatic adverse climatic changes during the next century. CO<sub>2</sub> is the most important greenhouse gas, so any international agreement will certainly cover CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Any international agreement to reduce emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> is going to have a significant impact on the markets for fossil fuels. The analysis shows that it is not only the amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions permitted in an agreement which matters for fossil fuel prices, but also the type of agreement. Two obvious forms of agreements, which under certain assumptions both are cost efficient, are (a) tradeable emission permits, and (b) an international CO<sub>2</sub> tax. If the fossil fuel markets were perfectly competitive, these two types of agreements would have the same effect on the producer price of fossil fuels. However, fossil fuel markets are not completely competitive. It is shown that, under imperfect competition, direct regulation of the ‘tradeable quotas’ type tends to imply higher producer prices and a larger efficiency loss than an international CO<sub>2</sub> tax giving the same total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. A numerical illustration of the oil market indicates that the difference in producer prices for the two types of CO<sub>2</sub> agreements is quite significant.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101080,"journal":{"name":"Resources and Energy","volume":"14 4","pages":"Pages 315-336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1992-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0165-0572(92)90001-W","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The oil market and international agreements on CO2 emissions\",\"authors\":\"Kjell Berger, Øyvind Fimreite, Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/0165-0572(92)90001-W\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>According to most scientists, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced significantly relative to current trends to avoid dramatic adverse climatic changes during the next century. CO<sub>2</sub> is the most important greenhouse gas, so any international agreement will certainly cover CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Any international agreement to reduce emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> is going to have a significant impact on the markets for fossil fuels. The analysis shows that it is not only the amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions permitted in an agreement which matters for fossil fuel prices, but also the type of agreement. Two obvious forms of agreements, which under certain assumptions both are cost efficient, are (a) tradeable emission permits, and (b) an international CO<sub>2</sub> tax. If the fossil fuel markets were perfectly competitive, these two types of agreements would have the same effect on the producer price of fossil fuels. However, fossil fuel markets are not completely competitive. It is shown that, under imperfect competition, direct regulation of the ‘tradeable quotas’ type tends to imply higher producer prices and a larger efficiency loss than an international CO<sub>2</sub> tax giving the same total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. A numerical illustration of the oil market indicates that the difference in producer prices for the two types of CO<sub>2</sub> agreements is quite significant.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101080,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Resources and Energy\",\"volume\":\"14 4\",\"pages\":\"Pages 315-336\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1992-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0165-0572(92)90001-W\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Resources and Energy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016505729290001W\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Resources and Energy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016505729290001W","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The oil market and international agreements on CO2 emissions
According to most scientists, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced significantly relative to current trends to avoid dramatic adverse climatic changes during the next century. CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas, so any international agreement will certainly cover CO2 emissions. Any international agreement to reduce emissions of CO2 is going to have a significant impact on the markets for fossil fuels. The analysis shows that it is not only the amount of CO2 emissions permitted in an agreement which matters for fossil fuel prices, but also the type of agreement. Two obvious forms of agreements, which under certain assumptions both are cost efficient, are (a) tradeable emission permits, and (b) an international CO2 tax. If the fossil fuel markets were perfectly competitive, these two types of agreements would have the same effect on the producer price of fossil fuels. However, fossil fuel markets are not completely competitive. It is shown that, under imperfect competition, direct regulation of the ‘tradeable quotas’ type tends to imply higher producer prices and a larger efficiency loss than an international CO2 tax giving the same total CO2 emissions. A numerical illustration of the oil market indicates that the difference in producer prices for the two types of CO2 agreements is quite significant.