石油市场和关于二氧化碳排放的国际协议

Kjell Berger, Øyvind Fimreite, Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel
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引用次数: 7

摘要

根据大多数科学家的说法,必须相对于当前趋势大幅减少温室气体排放,以避免在下个世纪发生剧烈的不利气候变化。二氧化碳是最重要的温室气体,因此任何国际协议都肯定涵盖二氧化碳排放。任何减少二氧化碳排放的国际协议都将对化石燃料市场产生重大影响。分析表明,影响化石燃料价格的不仅是协议中允许的二氧化碳排放量,还有协议的类型。在某些假设下,两种明显的协议形式都具有成本效益,即(a)可交易的排放许可证和(b)国际二氧化碳税。如果化石燃料市场完全竞争,这两种类型的协议将对化石燃料的生产者价格产生相同的影响。然而,化石燃料市场并不完全具有竞争力。研究表明,在不完全竞争的情况下,“可交易配额”类型的直接监管往往意味着比同等总二氧化碳排放量的国际二氧化碳税更高的生产者价格和更大的效率损失。石油市场的数字说明表明,这两种类型的二氧化碳协议的生产者价格差异相当大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The oil market and international agreements on CO2 emissions

According to most scientists, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced significantly relative to current trends to avoid dramatic adverse climatic changes during the next century. CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas, so any international agreement will certainly cover CO2 emissions. Any international agreement to reduce emissions of CO2 is going to have a significant impact on the markets for fossil fuels. The analysis shows that it is not only the amount of CO2 emissions permitted in an agreement which matters for fossil fuel prices, but also the type of agreement. Two obvious forms of agreements, which under certain assumptions both are cost efficient, are (a) tradeable emission permits, and (b) an international CO2 tax. If the fossil fuel markets were perfectly competitive, these two types of agreements would have the same effect on the producer price of fossil fuels. However, fossil fuel markets are not completely competitive. It is shown that, under imperfect competition, direct regulation of the ‘tradeable quotas’ type tends to imply higher producer prices and a larger efficiency loss than an international CO2 tax giving the same total CO2 emissions. A numerical illustration of the oil market indicates that the difference in producer prices for the two types of CO2 agreements is quite significant.

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