{"title":"市场状态与彩票偏好——来自中国开放式基金的证据*","authors":"Rongxin He, Pei-Lin Hsieh","doi":"10.1111/ajfs.12437","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent studies find that investors prefer funds with lottery-like payoffs. Using a sample of Chinese open-end funds, we show that investors' preference for funds' extreme positive payoffs (MAXs) depend on the state of the market: it is significant for MAXs in an unfavorable market but weak or reversed for those in a favorable market. Such state-dependent preference is irrational because, inconsistent with the flow–MAX relationship, higher MAXs under market downturns are associated with worse performance. We further document support for the salience-theory-based explanation for investors' preference and provide counter-evidence for alternative mechanisms based on rational choice or changes in aggregate flows.</p>","PeriodicalId":8570,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies","volume":"52 5","pages":"678-706"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Market States and Lottery Preference: Evidence from Chinese Open-End Funds*\",\"authors\":\"Rongxin He, Pei-Lin Hsieh\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ajfs.12437\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Recent studies find that investors prefer funds with lottery-like payoffs. Using a sample of Chinese open-end funds, we show that investors' preference for funds' extreme positive payoffs (MAXs) depend on the state of the market: it is significant for MAXs in an unfavorable market but weak or reversed for those in a favorable market. Such state-dependent preference is irrational because, inconsistent with the flow–MAX relationship, higher MAXs under market downturns are associated with worse performance. We further document support for the salience-theory-based explanation for investors' preference and provide counter-evidence for alternative mechanisms based on rational choice or changes in aggregate flows.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":8570,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies\",\"volume\":\"52 5\",\"pages\":\"678-706\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajfs.12437\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajfs.12437","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Market States and Lottery Preference: Evidence from Chinese Open-End Funds*
Recent studies find that investors prefer funds with lottery-like payoffs. Using a sample of Chinese open-end funds, we show that investors' preference for funds' extreme positive payoffs (MAXs) depend on the state of the market: it is significant for MAXs in an unfavorable market but weak or reversed for those in a favorable market. Such state-dependent preference is irrational because, inconsistent with the flow–MAX relationship, higher MAXs under market downturns are associated with worse performance. We further document support for the salience-theory-based explanation for investors' preference and provide counter-evidence for alternative mechanisms based on rational choice or changes in aggregate flows.
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