间谍活动转向经济:后苏联时代的反间谍诉讼

Craig P. Ehrlich
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在后冷战时代,外国经济间谍活动是一种迫在眉睫的威胁。作者详细研究了美国公司因外国政府或代理人窃取商业秘密而面临的诉讼选择。这些选择包括要求美国司法部根据最近颁布的1996年《经济间谍法》提起刑事诉讼。公司本身可以根据商业秘密普通法或《统一商业秘密法》以及联邦《受骗子影响和腐败组织法》提起民事赔偿诉讼。可能被起诉或起诉的被告类型包括窃取或接收商业机密的外国政府、帮助外国政府挪用资金的私人或公司,以及明知是被盗信息而接收的私人实体。外国政府使用的常见“诉讼盾牌”包括主权豁免、国家行为和外交豁免权。对每一种学说都进行了审查,并引用了它们被支持或被发现不适用的判例。通过分析这些先例,作者得出结论,外国政府特工为向商业企业进行经济间谍活动不应享有豁免权。©1997 John Wiley&;股份有限公司。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Espionage turns economic: Litigation as counter-espionage in the post-Soviet era

In the post-Cold War era, foreign economic espionage is a looming threat. The author examines in detail the litigation options for American corporations that fall victim to trade secret theft by a foreign government or agent. These options include a request that criminal prosecution be brought by the U.S. Justice Department under the recently enacted Economic Espionage Act of 1996. The corporation itself may file a civil suit for compensation based on the common laws of trade secrets or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as well as the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Among the types of defendants who might be prosecuted or sued are foreign governments that steal or receive trade secrets, private individuals or companies that help a foreign government commit misappropriation, and private entities that knowingly receive the stolen information. Common “litigation shields” used by foreign governments include claims of sovereign immunity, act of state, and diplomatic immunity. Each of these doctrines is examined, and case precedents where they were upheld or found inapplicable are cited. Analyzing these precedents, the author concludes that economic espionage by foreign government agents for delivery to a commercial enterprise should not be held subject to immunity. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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