民事责任和强制披露

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
M. Fox
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引用次数: 23

摘要

本文探讨了成熟的上市发行人违反强制性证券披露的民事责任制度。美国上市制度的设计已经过时,因为其基本的强制性披露制度已经从强调发行人在公开发行时进行披露,转变为强调发行人正在进行的定期披露。效率分析表明,与今天的美国法律不同,无论发行人当时是否发行证券,相关行为者都应该有同样大的民事责任激励来遵守披露规则。未公开发行证券的发行人不承担赔偿责任,赔偿理由不充分。相反,威慑将通过对其他行为者施加责任来实现。发行人的年度文件应由外部认证机构——投资银行或其他资本充足、具有金融专业知识的实体——签署。如果文件中包含重大错报,且认证机构未能尽职调查,则认证机构将面临计量责任。高级管理人员和董事也将承担类似的责任。损害赔偿应支付给开证人。当发行人进行公开发行时,它将因违反信息披露规定而对投资者承担责任,以消除不遵守规定的额外动机。这一设计将解决有关现有美国民事责任制度的两个主要投诉:承销商第11条对缺乏尽职调查的披露的责任,在现代发行中承销商没有实际的监督能力,以及诉讼费用高昂的发行人集体诉讼市场欺诈责任。这里建议的制度将消除这两种责任。但与承销商和发行人提出的取消改革不同,它将通过用更有效的民事责任激励措施来取代这些责任,从而保持威慑力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure
This paper explores the appropriate system of civil liability for mandatory securities disclosure violations by established, publicly traded issuers. The U.S. system's design has become outmoded as the underlying mandatory disclosure regime that has moved from an emphasis on disclosure at the time that an issuer makes a public offering, to an emphasis on the issuer's ongoing periodic disclosures. An efficiency analysis shows that, unlike U.S. law today, the relevant actors should have equally great civil liability incentives to comply with the disclosure rules whether or not the issuer is offering securities at the time. An issuer not making a public offering of securities should have no liability because the compensatory justification is weak. Deterrence will be achieved instead by imposing liability on other actors. An issuer's annual filings should be signed by an external certifier - an investment bank or other well capitalized entity with financial expertise. If the filing contains a material misstatement and the certifier fails to do due diligence, the certifier would face measured liability. Officers and directors would be subject to similar liability. Damages would be payable to the issuer. When an issuer is making a public offering, it would be liable to investors for its disclosure violations as an antidote to what otherwise would be an extra incentive not to comply. This design would address two major complaints concerning the existing U.S. civil liability system: underwriter Section 11 liability for a lack of due diligence concerning disclosures that in modern offerings underwriters have no realistic ability to police, and litigation-expensive issuer class action fraud-on-market liability. The system suggested here would eliminate both sorts of liability. But unlike elimination reforms proposed by underwriters and issuers, it would retain deterrence by substituting in place of these liabilities more effective and efficient civil liability incentives for disclosure compliance.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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