授权与司法覆核

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
T. Merrill
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引用次数: 0

摘要

代表团辩论的一个分主题涉及司法审查的重要性。最高法院经常支持对行政行为者的广泛授权,并在这样做时指出,司法审查可以保护公民不受不受约束的政府权力的滥用。(1)法院认为,宪法允许将权力广泛授权给行政行为者,这在很大程度上是因为法院随时准备向公民保证,行政部门将以符合国会授权的方式、以满足理性决策要求的方式行使其自由裁量权。行政法教授强调了这一点。肯尼斯·卡尔普·戴维斯教授以其独特的风格,将这一主题发挥到了极致。他认为,非授权原则真正重要的不是国会必须提供一个可理解的原则,而是司法审查可以确保行政机构遵循这一原则。(3)重要的是某人在某地为行政自由裁量权的行使提供了一个标准,法院可以执行这个标准。(4)标准从何而来并不重要。国会可以提供,但机构甚至法院也可以提供。重要的是要有一些标准来控制自由裁量权,加上司法审查。在惠特曼诉美国卡车运输协会案中,法院驳回了这一特殊想法。(5)大法官斯卡利亚(Justice Scalia)在为最高法院撰写的意见书中,认为一个机构可以通过采用自我限制的标准来解决不授权的问题,这种观点是“内部矛盾的”。(6)正如他所解释的那样:“选择行使哪一部分权力——也就是说,国会省略的标准规定——本身就是对被禁止的立法权的行使。”(7)关于美国卡车运输,很少有人注意到的是,法院在解释自我限制标准的想法时,也省略了接受司法审查的仪式,这是防止滥用广泛授权的重要保障。当然,法院重申,成文法是否违反不授权原则的问题应由法院决定。(8)法院对引发非授权质疑的机关决定进行了有力的司法审查,认为机关的决定是不合理的。(9)但是,斯卡利亚大法官和任何持同意意见的大法官都没有说,司法审查本身是解决授权挑战的一个相关因素。这就引出了我的话题:在一个可理解的原则学说实际上已经死亡的世界里,司法审查在确定广泛授权的合宪性方面的作用是什么?为了使这个问题具体化,让我来描述最近在埃尔帕索县诉纳波利塔诺案中被最高法院驳回的调卷请求。(10)请愿书是由耶鲁大学法学院最高法院诊所于2008年12月提出的,我目前是该诊所的主管。2009年6月15日,在会议重新列出请愿书七次之后,法院驳回了调卷请求。(12)一如往常,法院没有对拒绝作出解释。请愿书对1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法案》(IIRIRA)的修正案提出了质疑,该修正案指示国土安全部长在墨西哥和美国之间的部分边境地区建立一道屏障,以帮助控制非法进入美国的人。(14)国会力图确保篱笆能尽快建成,特别是确保这个价值数百万美元的建筑工程不会因诉讼而陷入困境。为了实现这一目标,国会于2005年修订了IIRIRA。(15)经修订的法规在第102(c)条中授权国土安全部长“根据其自行判断,放弃为确保迅速建造[围栏]所必需的所有法律要求”。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Delegation and Judicial Review
One of the subthemes in the delegation debate concerns the importance of judicial review. The Supreme Court has often upheld broad delegations to administrative actors and in so doing has pointed out that judicial review is available to safeguard citizens from the abuse of unconstrained government power. (1) Broad delegations of power to executive actors are constitutionally permissible, the Court has suggested, in significant part because courts stand ready to assure citizens that the executive will discharge its discretion in a manner consistent with Congress's mandate and in a fashion that otherwise satisfies the requirements of reasoned decision making. (2) Administrative law professors have underscored this point. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in his inimitable style, took the theme to the utmost extreme. He argued that what is really significant about the nondelegation doctrine is not that Congress must provide an intelligible principle, but that judicial review is available to make sure that administrative agencies follow the principle. (3) What matters is that someone, somewhere, supplies a standard for the exercise of administrative discretion and that the courts can enforce this standard. (4) It does not really matter where the standard comes from. Congress might supply it, but so too might an agency or even a court. The important thing is to have some standard to control discretion, plus judicial review. The Court rejected this particular idea in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations. (5) Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, dismissed as "internally contradictory" the notion that an agency could cure a nondelegation problem by adopting a self-limiting standard. (6) As he explained: "The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise--that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted--would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority." (7) What has been less noticed about American Trucking is that the Court, having interred the self-limiting-standards idea, also omitted the ritual bow to judicial review as an important safeguard against abuses of broad delegations. To be sure, the Court reaffirmed that the question whether a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine is for the courts to decide. (8) And the Court engaged in vigorous judicial review of the agency decision that triggered the nondelegation challenge, holding that the agency's decision was unreasonable. (9) But neither Justice Scalia nor any of the concurring Justices said that the availability of judicial review was itself a relevant element in resolving the delegation challenge. Which leads to my topic: What is the role of judicial review in determining the constitutionality of broad delegations of power in a world in which the intelligible principle doctrine is, for practical purposes, dead? To make this question concrete, let me describe a petition for certiorari recently denied by the Supreme Court in County of El Paso v. Napolitano. (10) The petition was filed in December 2008 by the Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic, of which I am currently a supervisor. The Court denied certiorari on June 15, 2009, (11) after the conference relisted the petition seven times. (12) As is usual, the Court gave no explanation for the denial. The petition challenged an amendment to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), (13) which instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to build a barrier fence along portions of the border between Mexico and the United States to help control illegal entry into the United States. (14) Congress sought to assure that the fence was built as quickly as possible and, in particular, that this multimillion dollar construction project would not become bogged down in litigation. To achieve this objective, Congress amended IIRIRA in 2005. (15) The amended statute, in Section 102(c), delegates authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security to "waive all legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary's sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of [the fence]. …
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0.80
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期刊介绍: The Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy is published three times annually by the Harvard Society for Law & Public Policy, Inc., an organization of Harvard Law School students. The Journal is one of the most widely circulated student-edited law reviews and the nation’s leading forum for conservative and libertarian legal scholarship. The late Stephen Eberhard and former Senator and Secretary of Energy E. Spencer Abraham founded the journal twenty-eight years ago and many journal alumni have risen to prominent legal positions in the government and at the nation’s top law firms.
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