具有技术溢出的双头垄断中的价格vs数量:福利重新评估

Keio economic studies Pub Date : 2000-01-01 DOI:10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/685

L. Lambertini, A. Mantovani

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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们在企业激活研发的模型中分析了市场变量的选择问题，并且(ii)存在一组相关参数，其中仁慈的社会计划者更喜欢数量设定而不是价格设定。当研发活动的边际成本相对较低而技术外部性相对较高时，就会发生这种情况。在这种情况下，社会偏好和个人偏好之间对市场行为类型的冲突就消失了。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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PRICE VS QUANTITY IN A DUOPOLY WITH TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS: A WELFARE RE-APPRAISAL

We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate RD and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.

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Keio economic studies

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