{"title":"论麦克塔格特悖论之争的逻辑结构","authors":"Q. Smith","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891413","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This short article aims to illustrate the mutually question-begging arguments that are often presented in debates between opponents and defenderss of McTaggart's ·proof' that A-properties (pastness, presentness and futurity) are logically incoherent. A sample of such arguments is taken from a recent debate between L. Nathan Oaklander (a defender of McTaggart) and myself (an opponent of McTaggart) and a method of escaping the impasse that is often reached in such debates is suggested.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"371-379"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891413","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Logical Structure of the Debate About McTaggart’s Paradox\",\"authors\":\"Q. Smith\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/PRA1988/19891413\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This short article aims to illustrate the mutually question-begging arguments that are often presented in debates between opponents and defenderss of McTaggart's ·proof' that A-properties (pastness, presentness and futurity) are logically incoherent. A sample of such arguments is taken from a recent debate between L. Nathan Oaklander (a defender of McTaggart) and myself (an opponent of McTaggart) and a method of escaping the impasse that is often reached in such debates is suggested.\",\"PeriodicalId\":82315,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"371-379\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1988-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891413\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891413\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891413","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Logical Structure of the Debate About McTaggart’s Paradox
This short article aims to illustrate the mutually question-begging arguments that are often presented in debates between opponents and defenderss of McTaggart's ·proof' that A-properties (pastness, presentness and futurity) are logically incoherent. A sample of such arguments is taken from a recent debate between L. Nathan Oaklander (a defender of McTaggart) and myself (an opponent of McTaggart) and a method of escaping the impasse that is often reached in such debates is suggested.
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