Schoeman’s Alternative to the Liberal View of the Family

Ferdinand Schoeman criticizes the liberal view of the family which holds that parental rights are based in and limited by parental duties to the child. Instead he proposes the construction of principles based on the value of familial intimacy. Schoeman claims that only by recognizing the value of intimacy can we account for the degree of autonomy we legitimately grant parents in their relations with their children. In opposition, I argue that he misinterprets the liberal view. A correct interpretation allows an appropriate degree of parental autonomy and familial intimacy but without sacrificing the child's developmental needs. A widely held interpretation of the liberal view of the family maintains that the primary basis of parental rights is to permit parents to fulfill their paternalistic duties to provide for the welfare of their children. Therefore parental duties take precedence over parental rights. When a child's welfare would be seriously endangered by a parental decision or action, the state has a duty to intervene. Influenced by this perspective, the courts have adopted a "best interests of the child" standard of reviewing cases involving child rearing. Ferdinand Schoeman criticizes this view in three essays on the basis and limits of parental autonomy.l Schoeman's disagreement with the liberal position involves the following claims: 1) Liberalism cannot account for the degree of autonomy we legitimately grant parents in their relations with their children. 2) Because the family has its own goals and principles of decision making, liberal principles should not be imposed upon it. 3) Liberalism ignores and fails to protect the value of the intimacy of familial relationships. 4) By adopting the legalistic language of rights and duties liberalism cannot adequately analyze intimate relationships.